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THE THEOLOGICAL CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
. Introduction
In a system of taxation based on justice and equity, it is funda-
mental that the burdens be proportioned to the capacity of the
people contributing.
Pope John XXIII, Mater et magistra, May 15, 1961, 132: in
The Papal Encyclicals 1958-1981, ed. Claudia Carlen (Ann
Arbor: Pierian Press, 1990).
All the moral principles that govern the just operation of any
economic endeavor apply to the Church and its agencies and in-
stitutions; indeed the Church should be exemplary.
NCCB, "Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy" T 347, Ori-
gins 16 (June 5, 1986) 446.
Simply put, canon 1263 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law allows the
diocesan bishop to impose two different taxes on the parishes in his dio-
cese for diocesan needs-a so-called "ordinary tax" and an "extraordi-
nary" exaction.' Using the words in the leading English translation,
canon 1263 requires at least the former and probably also the latter, "to
be proportionate to [the parishes'] income."2 To a tax lawyer, the adjec-
tive "proportionate" describes a so-called "flat tax," or a system that im-
poses the same tax rate on every taxpayer's taxable income. Canon law
commentators, however, have consistently agreed that canon 1263 also
authorizes a progressive tax, which in this article's context would impose
a higher marginal tax rate on parishes with larger incomes. 3 This article
contends that Catholic social thought, including the U.S. Bishops' pas-
toral letter on the U.S. economy,4 as well as the economic policies sup-
porting progressive taxes, urge diocesan bishops in the United States to
1 See infra, notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
2 See also infra, note 17 and accompanying text. Unless otherwise indicated, all code
citations come from New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, ed. John P. Beal et al.
(New York: Paulist Press, 2000).
3 The term "progressive" can describe changes in either the marginal or the effective
rates of taxation as income increases. See infra, note 88. Unless otherwise indicated, this
article uses the term "progressive" to refer to graduated marginal tax rates.
4 NCCB, "Economic Justice for All."
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use progressive rates whenever they impose diocesan taxes and assess-
ments5 under canon 1263.6
In gathering information for this article, a survey conducted by Re-
search Librarian Patti Ogden of the Notre Dame Law School (the "Notre
Dame Law School survey" or the "NDLS survey") allowed the author to
obtain data from eighty-five of the 176 geographic dioceses in the Unit-
ed States.7 The NDLS survey revealed that where diocesan taxes or as-
sessments are imposed, flat tax rates are used almost four times more fre-
quently than progressive rates. In addition, the information gathered
during the survey suggests that several practices regarding diocesan tax-
ation in this country continue to deviate from canon law's requirements.
8
Given this survey's findings and Catholic social teaching on distributive
justice, this article recommends a review of diocesan tax and assessment
policies and practices across the country. Where necessary or appropri-
ate, this article respectfully calls for certain changes in those policies and
practices, especially the conversion to progressive tax rates. While under
canon law only the diocesan bishop can implement any such changes, the
faithful, especially those individuals who serve on the diocesan finance
council or the presbyteral council, can help to persuade the bishop to re-
examine the taxing policies in the diocese.
5 Some dioceses use other terminology to refer to amounts that the bishop requires a
parish to pay to the diocese to support diocesan operations and priorities, including labels
such as "Management Service Fee," "mandatory 'target,"' "parish assessments," "Parish
Share goal," "quota," or "taxa." See infra, note 132.
6 This article addresses only diocesan taxes or assessments under canon 1263 in the
United States. See, e.g., Donald J. Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation of Parishes in the United
States, Sign of Communio or Source of Tension?," CLSA Proceedings 60 (1998) 69. Pre-
sumably, however, similar arguments would apply in other countries and throughout the
universal Church.
7 As mentioned in the introductory footnote, eighty-two dioceses responded to the
NDLS survey. Of that group, five dioceses declined to share information about their dioce-
san taxes or assessments. Diocesan web sites provided facts about diocesan taxes or as-
sessments in eight other dioceses, allowing the author to collect data about the taxing prac-
tices in eighty-five dioceses.
8 Donald J. Frugd reported similar findings more than twenty years ago, prior to the
adoption of the 1983 code. Donald J. Frug6, The Taxation Practices of United States Bish-
ops in Relation to the Authority of Bishops to TaxAccording to the Code of Canon Law and
Proposed Revisions, Canon Law Studies 506 (Washington: Catholic University of Amer-
ica, 1982) 138, 139-190 [on file with Catholic University of America Library, University
Microfilms International, and the author]. Frug6 concludes that various provisions in the
1917 code did not authorize then-existing taxing practices in the United States. Frug6 also
repeats the claim that "the taxation practices of United States bishops before the present
1983 Code were prohibited by the 1917 Code." See idem, "Diocesan Taxation," 73.
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Part II of this article examines canon 1263, which was promulgated
during the most recent revision of canon law in 1983, and the specific re-
quirements that a diocesan bishop must fulfill before imposing a dioce-
san tax under that provision. Part III summarizes the results of the NDLS
survey on current diocesan taxation practices in the United States and
similar findings in three earlier surveys on such practices before Pope
John Paul II promulgated the 1983 code. Part IV discusses Catholic so-
cial teaching about distributive justice, including those portions of the
U.S. Bishops' 1986 pastoral letter on the U.S. economy 9 that discuss
taxation. In that letter, which sought "to articulate a moral perspective in
the general societal and economic debate that surrounds [economic deci-
sion making]," the bishops specifically listed "research projects in our
universities" as among the "appropriate means for continued discussion
and action."10 With some trepidation,' 1 but after my prayerful reflection,
this article asks the bishops, the diocesan finance councils, the pres-
byteral councils, and the faithful in the United States to consider whether
the diocesan tax and assessment policies in their dioceses "flow from the
ethical moral vision outlined [in the bishops' 1986 letter].' '12 Part V con-
cludes that Catholic social teaching, including Scripture, papal encycli-
cals, and other documents of the universal Church, and the bishops' own
teachings, plus the general policies supporting progressive taxes, should
9 NCCB, "Economic Justice for All" U 76, 117, 118, 123, 202, 215. The bishops' let-
ter generated significant controversy and definite criticism. See, e.g., The Catholic Chal-
lenge to the American Economy: Reflections on the U.S. Bishops' Pastoral Letter on
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, ed. Thomas M. Gannon (New York:
Macmillan, 1987), presenting various views on the bishops' letter. More recently, some
commentators contend that a subsequent papal encyclical has rejected the letter's control-
ling assumptions. See, e.g., Richard John Neuhaus, "An Argument About Human Na-
ture," in A New Worldly Order: John Paul II and Human Freedom, ed. George Weigel
(Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1992) 123-124. Such criticisms, however,
do not involve the teaching about tax policies.
10 NCCB, "Economic Justice for All" 360, 447. In particular, that letter explicitly
mentioned "tax reforms to express the preferential option for the poor" as among the areas
for further research. Ibid. 362. More recently, on the tenth anniversary of the bishops' let-
ter, the U.S. bishops again urged Catholic educational institutions to contribute to the
common good by their research and educational activities. NCCB, "A Decade after 'Eco-
nomic Justice for All:' Continuing Principles, Changing Context, New Challenges," Ori-
gins 25 (November 23, 1995) 389.
11 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, "The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate,"
Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management 4 (2002) 4-5. Bainbridge express-
es similar apprehension about taking issue with certain aspects of the bishops' pastoral let-
ter on economic justice, but notes that the Church especially encourages lay initiative
when the matter involves economic life, and presumably also taxation.
12 NCCB, "Economic Justice forAll" 360, 447.
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convince the bishops in the United States to use progressive rates when-
ever they impose taxes under canon 1263. In essence, the bishops should
practice what the gospel, the universal Church, and they themselves
teach. Although beyond the scope of this article, the use of progressive
taxation would also enable the bishops in the United States to speak more
authentically against the periodically recurring efforts to move to a flat
federal income tax.' 3 Finally, the conclusion in part V urges the bishops
and the faithful to review the diocesan tax and assessment policies in
their dioceses. To facilitate this process, the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops ("USCCB") should consider undertaking a project that
would draft one or more "model" progressive diocesan tax systems for
diocesan bishops to present to their dioceses for consultation and possi-
ble implementation.
II. Canon 1263 and Its Requirements
The 1983 code14 added canon 1263, which currently serves as "the pri-
mary legislation that enables dioceses to tax parishes." 15 According to
the leading translation in the United States, the canon, which has been
13 See infra, note 254 and accompanying text.
14 John Paul II promulgated the code on January 25, 1983, the feast of the conversion
of St. Paul. After a ten-month vacatio legis, the period during which the Church tem-
porarily suspended the revised code to give administrators a reasonable amount of time to
prepare for the required changes, the code became effective on November 27, 1983, the
First Sunday of Advent. John A. Alesandro, "The Revision of the Code of Canon Law: A
Background Study," Studia Canonica 24 (1990) 129-130. Alesandro's work also provides
an excellent overview discussing the general process of the revision of the 1917 code.
15 Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 77. Other provisions in canon law allow a bishop to
impose other taxes on the parishes in his diocese. See Robert L. Kealy, "Taxation, Assess-
ments and Extraordinary Collections," in Church Finance Handbook, ed. Kevin E.
McKenna et al. (Washington: CLSA, 1999) 79. For example, canon 264, §1 allows the
bishop to impose a seminary tax. Donald J. Frug6 notes that commentators sometimes
refer to the fees that a bishop may charge for various administrative acts, judicial costs,
stole fees, or Mass offerings as taxes. Frug6, 68, n. 4; see also canon 1264, § 1 (adminis-
trative fees) and canon 1649 (judicial fees). I agree with those commentators who view
such fees not as revenues or taxes, but as reimbursements for expenses incurred. See, e.g.,
Kealy, 88. The NDLS survey documents that some dioceses pass-through to the parishes
certain costs, such as the salaries, benefits, and travel expenses of the chaplains who staff
area hospitals and long-term care facilities, but do not consider the "reimbursements" as
taxes or assessments. See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response No. 51. If these dioceses in fact
act as "the agent" of the parishes in such a program, then the reimbursement characteriza-
tion seems appropriate. If, however, the bishop requires a parish to participate in such a
diocesan program, then the underlying assessment must satisfy the requirements of canon
1263. See infra, notes 35-129 and accompanying text.
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described as "the most significant and the most controversial canon in
Book V on Temporal Goods," 16 provides:
After the diocesan bishop has heard the finance council and
the presbyteral council, he has the right to impose a moderate tax
for the needs of the diocese upon public juridic persons subject
to his governance; this tax is to be proportionate to their income.
He is permitted only to impose an extraordinary and moderate
exaction upon other physical and juridic persons in case of grave
necessity and under the same conditions, without prejudice to
particular laws and customs which attribute greater rights to
him.
17
16 Robert L. Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support: Its History and Canonical Status,
J.C.D. diss. (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1986) 310 [on file with author]; see
also Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 69.
17 New Commentary, 1463. Interestingly, the CLSA also published an earlier, but sim-
ilar, translation as follows:
The diocesan bishop has the right to impose a moderate tax on public juridic per-
sons subject to his authority; this tax, which should be proportionate to their in-
come, is for diocesan needs and may be imposed only after hearing the diocesan
finance council and the presbyteral council; he can impose an extraordinary and
moderate tax on other physical and juridic persons only in cases of grave neces-
sity and under the same conditions with due regard for particular laws and cus-
toms attributing even more significant rights to him.
The Code of Canon Law: A Text and Commentary, ed. James A Coriden et al. (New York:
Paulist Press, 1985) 865.
Other English translations use slightly different language. For example, the translation
that The Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland prepared in association with The
Canadian Canon Law Society states:
The diocesan Bishop, after consulting the finance committee and the council of
priests, has the right to levy on public juridical persons subject to his authority a
tax for the needs of the diocese. This tax must be moderate and proportionate to
their income. He may impose an extraordinary and moderate tax on other phys-
ical and juridical persons only in a grave necessity and under the same condi-
tions, but without prejudice to particular laws and customs which may give him
greater fights.
The Canon Law: Letter & Spirit, ed. Gerald Sheehy et al. (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical
Press, 1995) 712; see also Code of Canon Law Annotated, ed. Ernesto Caparros et al.
(Montreal: Wilson and Lafleur Limitfe, 1993) 780-781. Finally, Robert L. Kealy, who has
written extensively on this subject, offers this similar translation:
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Canon 1263, therefore, offers a diocesan bishop two important
sources of tax revenues. 18 The canon designates the second of these
The diocesan bishop, having consulted the finance council and the presbyteral
council, has the right to impose on public juridic persons subject to his gover-
nance a moderate tax, proportionate to their income, for the needs of the diocese;
it is also lawful for him, in case of grave necessity and under the same condi-
tions, to impose an extraordinary and moderate exaction on physical persons and
other juridic persons, without prejudice to particular laws and customs which
grant him greater rights.
Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 311.
Although the differences in language between the various translations do not appear sig-
nificant, the original and newer Latin versions in the CLSA's Latin-English edition use a
semicolon to separate the two taxes authorized in canon 1263. Fmg6, "Diocesan Taxa-
tion," 69. For a further discussion of the possible implications of this distinction in punc-
tuation, see infra, note 127 and accompanying text. The original Latin version of canon
1263 provides:
lus est Episcopo dioecesano, auditis consilio a rebus oeconomicis et consilio
presbyterali, pro dioecesis necessitatibus, personis iuridicis publicis suo regimi-
ni subiectis, moderatum tributum, earum redditibus proportionatum, imponendi;
ceteris personis physicis et iuridicis ipsi licet tantum, in casu gravis necessitatis
et sub iisdem condicionibus, extraordinariam et moderatam exactionem im-
ponere, salvis legibus et consuetudinibus particularibus quae eidem potiora iura
tribuant.
CLSA, Code of Canon Law: Latin-English Edition (Washington: CLSA, 1995) 450. The
most recent Latin version deletes a comma in the third line of text as follows:
lus est Episcopo dioecesano, auditis consilio a rebus oeconomicis et consilio
presbyterali, pro dioecesis necessitatibus, personis iuridicis publicis suo regimi-
ni subiectis moderatum tributum, earum redditibus proportionatum, imponendi;
ceteris personis physicis et iuridicis ipsi licet tantum, in casu gravis necessitatis
et sub iisdem condicionibus, extraordinariam et moderatam exactionem im-
ponere, salvis legibus et consuetudinibus particularibus quae eidem potiora iura
tribuant.
CLSA, Code of Canon Law: Latin-English Edition, New English Translation (Washing-
ton: CLSA, 1998) 390-391. Most significantly for the purposes of this article, one should
observe that the leading translation in the United States uses separate sentences for the two
taxes, while the Latin text places a semicolon between the different exactions. See New
Commentary, supra.
18 In addition to taxes and fees, other ways to raise funds for the diocese include free-
will offerings (c. 1262), special collections (c. 1266), and pious wills and bequests (c.
1299). See Kealy, "Taxation," 79. In fact, diocesan taxes or assessments under canon 1263
typically depend in large measure upon voluntary offerings from the faithful, which pro-
vide the main source of revenue for most parishes in this country. Ibid., 86. As an initial
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exactions as "extraordinary." Although canon law does not use the label,
commentators often refer to the first levy as an "ordinary tax."' 9 Before
we can analyze canon 1263's specific requirements for the so-called "or-
dinary" and extraordinary taxes, we must understand the entire provi-
sion's present and historical context.
Because the 1917 code did not contain any "real equivalent" 20 to
canon 1263, one leading commentary describes that provision as "a
matter, canon 1262 calls upon the faithful to contribute to the Church's support by re-
sponding to fund-raising appeals and according to the norms that the conference of bish-
ops establishes. At the NCCB's general meeting in November 1984, the bishops approved
a complementary norm under canon 1262 that authorizes diocesan bishops in this country
to establish such norms for the faithful in their own dioceses. USCCB, "Canon 1262 -
Fund-Raising," in Index of Complementary Norms [database on-line] (USCCB, 2002, vis-
ited July 28, 2004); available from http://www.usccb.org/norms/1262.htm. Several com-
mentators have suggested that the fact that this canon on so-called "free will offerings"
precedes canon 1263, the canon on taxation, "accords primacy to free-will offerings given
in response to fund-raising appeals" and documents canon law's preference for the former.
Robert T. Kennedy, "Book V: The Temporal Goods of the Church," in New Commentary,
1463; see also Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 74, n. 26. In addition, canon 1266 gives a bish-
op the authority to order special collections for specific parochial, diocesan, national, or
universal projects. If either a diocesan "free-will" appeal or special collection imposes a
mandatory goal, quota, or target on a parish, I agree with other commentators who con-
clude that the requirements in canon 1263 apply. Frug6, Taxation Practices, 134; Kealy,
Diocesan Financial Support, 341-342; Kennedy, "Book V," 1465.
19 See, e.g., Kennedy, "Book V," 1463; see also Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 69; see
also infra, note 35 and accompanying text.
20 Francis G. Morrisey, in Letter & Spirit, 712, n. 2. The leading commentary on the
code in the United States concludes that previous texts have "amply traced" the canon's
legislative history. Kennedy, "Book V," 1463, n. 39, citing Kealy, Diocesan Financial Sup-
port, 312-330, and Frug6, "Taxes in the Proposed Law," CLSA Proceedings 44 (1982)
279-287; see also Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 69-74. Two commentators credit the late
Cardinal John Krol of Philadelphia and the late Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, then the Arch-
bishop of Cincinnati, respectively, for first proposing and then supporting the reformulat-
ed text that eventually led to canon 1263 at the October 1981 plenary meeting of the Com-
mission for the Revision of the Code of Canon Law (the "Revision Commission"). Frug6,
"Diocesan Taxation," 72-73; see also Kealy, 325-329. At the plenary session, Cardinal
Krol argued:
In many dioceses in the United States of America and in other regions, there is
the legitimate custom of a moderate and proportionate diocesan tax, which sys-
tem of taxes for parishes also gives the Archdiocese of Philadelphia the ability of
ministering to our portion of the people of God with annual expenses needing to
be met in excess of two hundred million American dollars and of contributing to
the domestic and foreign missions and various charities and similar works. Ibid.,
327.
Although the 1917 code does not contain a predecessor provision to canon 1263,
canons 1502 and 1504 to 1506 of the 1917 code provide some background. Letter & Spir-
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substantial innovation in the Church's law."21 Given significant changes
in the way Vatican II viewed the Church's temporal goods and pastoral
structure relative to the benefice system 22 underlying the 1917 code,
other commentators have described canon 1263 as a "radical departure
from a long canonical tradition,"23 a "dramatic development from the
revenue-raising powers accorded the bishop in the 1917 Code,"24 and "a
return to an older canonical tradition [based on] the communitarian na-
ture of ecclesiastical assets."
25
The 1917 code presumed that endowment income from benefices
would provide much, or perhaps even most, financial support for the
Church.26 Under that benefice system, the Church essentially "looked on
the income of a parish (or diocese) primarily as a means of support for
it, supra. Canon 1502 of the 1917 code called upon the faithful to observe the special laws
or customs in their area that might require them to pay tithes or first-fruits, but did not con-
tain any general provision that required their payment. Kealy, 184.
In fact, the 1917 code severely limited a diocesan bishop's power to tax. Kennedy,
1463. Canon 1504 required every church and benefice subject to the bishop's jurisdiction
to pay a "modest financial tribute," known as the cathedraticum, as a sign of subjection to
the bishop. John J. Myers, "The Temporal Goods of the Church," in The Code of Canon
Law, ed. Coriden, 866, also observing that while the cathedraticum "was not normally
part of the life of the Church in the United States, ... diocesan assessments have been
sometimes designated improperly as such"; Kealy, 184-185. By comparison, canon 1505
allowed the local bishop to impose an extraordinary and moderate tax to satisfy a special
diocesan need. Ibid., 187. Commentators on the 1917 code customarily referred to this tax
as the subsidium caritativum. Myers, 865. Finally, canon 1506 allowed a bishop to impose
a tax on churches, benefices, and other ecclesiastical institutions on the occasion of their
foundation or consecration. Kealy, 191. Canon 1506 of the 1917 code also stipulated that
the bishop could not levy a tax on Mass stipends. Ibid., 198. Although the Revision Com-
mission expressed its intent to maintain this rule, the prohibition does not appear in the
promulgated code. One commentary has asserted that "such a significant omission leaves
open the possibility that a diocesan bishop could tax the income which priests serving in
his diocese receive from Mass stipends." Myers, 866. At least one other commentary, how-
ever, disagrees, opining that any effort to tax such stipends under canon 1263 would con-
stitute "an abuse." Letter & Spirit, 713.
21 Francis G. Morrisey, in Letter & Spirit, 712; see also Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation,"
69.
22 Under the benefice system, which developed during feudal times, the benefice-
holder, often the pastor of a particular parish, could use the income from the benefice,
which we might describe as an endowment today, to support the activities of the particu-
lar parish, including his own support. Kealy, "Taxation," 78.
Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 69; see also idem, "Taxes in the Proposed Law," 274.
24 Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 311-312.
25 See Kealy, "Taxation," 78.
26 Myers, "Temporal Goods of the Church," 865.
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the [person] who held the office of pastor."27 In addition, the Church con-
sidered the parish's assets as belonging to that parish and that parish
alone. 28 As a result, each parish, and its pastor, enjoyed considerable fi-
nancial autonomy, which sometimes led to actions or decisions that fa-
vored the pastor's or the parish's financial desires rather than the needs of
the poor or the universal Church. 29 By comparison, the 1983 code re-
flects the ecclesiological perspective of Vatican II, which retrieved the
ancient understanding of the diocese as a particular church in its own
right.30 Consistent with this theological perspective, the 1983 code abro-
gated the feudal understanding of the parish as primarily a benefice for
the pastor. It envisions the parish as a stably constituted community of
the Christian faithful and basic unit of the diocese. 31 Accordingly, canon
1263 recognizes an individual parish's "obligation to the wider ecclesial
community. ' 32 This perspective accords with the teaching of Vatican II
that considers the Church's temporal goods "as a common patrimony
meant to serve ecclesial communion as well as the particular ends of cer-
tain individuals or groups."33 Both Vatican II and the 1983 code, there-
fore, understand the diocesan bishop as the overall pastor of the particu-
lar church and call him to oversee a more equitable distribution of the
temporal goods within the diocese, while also asking him to keep in mind
the Church's needs outside his diocese. 34 Given this context, we can pro-
ceed to discuss the two taxes that canon 1263 authorizes, beginning with
the ordinary tax.
A. So-Called "Ordinary" Taxes
Canon 1263 sets forth at least six different limitations before a bishop
can legitimately impose an ordinary tax. 35 Those limitations provide the
27 Kealy, "Taxation," 78.
21 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Canon 368 describes particular churches, especially dioceses as the basic commu-
nal units "in which and from which exists the one and unique Catholic Church." See also
Myers, "Temporal Goods of the Church," 865; Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 80.
31 See 1983codec. 515,§1.
32 Francis G. Morrisey, in Letter & Spirit, 712.
33 See Kealy, "Taxation," 78.
34 Ibid., 78-79.
35 Because the requirements for the first tax in canon 1263 neither refer to grave ne-
cessity nor designate the tax as "extraordinary," Kennedy concludes that the tax can serve
as a "regularly recurring means of raising funds to meet regularly recurring diocesan
needs." Kennedy, "Book V," 1463. Kennedy posits that the canon does not use the word
"ordinary" in an effort "to give primacy to voluntary responses to fund-raising appeals as
the preferred mode of acquisition," reasoning that any reference to an "ordinary tax"
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answers to the following questions: (1) who can impose the tax (the
"diocesan bishop"), (2) who must pay the tax ("public juridic persons
subject to his governance"), (3) what can the diocesan bishop tax ("their
income"), (4) to what extent can the bishop impose the tax (the tax must
qualify as both "moderate" and "proportionate to income"), (5) for what
purpose does the tax apply (to finance "the needs of the diocese"), and (6)
after what, if any, consultation ("after the diocesan bishop has heard the
finance council and the presbyteral council").36 Commentators have
opined that the bishop may impose either a permanent or temporary ex-
action under canon 1263, but that he must issue a decree adapting the tax
to canon law.37 Presumably, such a decree must specify precisely those
juridic persons subject to taxation, define assessable income, state the
applicable tax rates or percentages, describe the tax's destination, and ar-
ticulate the reasons for the decree. 38 A more detailed discussion of the six
different limitations on "ordinary" taxes follows.
1. The Diocesan Bishop
Only "the diocesan bishop" may impose the ordinary tax under canon
1263.39 Under canon 376, the term "diocesan bishop" means a bishop to
whom the pope has entrusted the care of a diocese.40 Notably, the term
does not include auxiliary bishops, who are often called "titular bishops"
because the pope has assigned them to a diocese that at one time flour-
ished, but that now exists only in name.
4 1
might suggest that such a tax would function as "an expected or preferred mode of ac-
quiring needed funds." Ibid. An earlier version of that text, however, expressed a slightly
different perspective that saw the ordinary means of support as including both an annual
fund-raising drive and an annual tax or parish assessment. Myers, "The Temporal Goods
of the Church," 865: "the lack of restrictions plus the designation of a secondary and ex-
traordinary tax later in the canon favor the interpretation that this tax may be an ordinary
means of diocesan support."
36 Kennedy, "Book V," 1463.
37 Mariano Lopez Alarc6n, in Code of Canon Law Annotated, 781.
38 Ibid. In addition, a change in any of these elements presumably results in an amend-
ment to the tax that requires a new consultation with both the finance and presbyteral
councils. See Kealy, "Taxation," 77, 90 (case 15).
39 Kennedy, "Book V," 1463. Section 2 of canon 381, however, treats those individu-
als who preside over the other communities of the faithful mentioned in canon 368 as
"equivalent in law to a diocesan bishop" in certain contexts. In "quite extraordinary cir-
cumstances," a leading text suggests that the diocesan administrator, elected according to
canon 421, could also impose a tax. Morrisey, in Letter & Spirit, 712, n. 5.
40 Canon 376 refers to all other bishops as titular. See also Kealy, Diocesan Financial
Support, 295.
41 Kevin E. McKenna, A Concise Guide to Canon Law (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press,
2000)116, 124.
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2. Public Juridic Persons Subject to His Governance
The diocesan bishop can impose an ordinary tax under canon 1263
only on public juridic persons,42 most notably parishes, "subject to his
governance." The term "public juridic persons" can include dioceses;
conferences of bishops; parishes; religious institutes or societies of apos-
tolic life and their provinces and houses; seminaries; certain colleges,
universities, or hospitals; and other educational, charitable, or apostolic
groups.43 The ordinary tax in canon 1263, however, applies only to those
public juridic persons "subject to [the diocesan bishop's] authority."
Canon law, for example, grants autonomy of governance to all religious
institutes and apostolic societies even though they remain subject to the
42 Because the ordinary tax applies only to "public juridic persons," a brief discussion
about the term "juridic persons" and the distinction between "public" and "private" juridic
persons seems appropriate here. Section 2 of canon 113 recognizes the existence ofjuridic
persons; but the code does not define the term, "leaving [its] definition to canonical ju-
risprudence." Robert T. Kennedy, "Physical and Juridic Persons," in New Commentary,
154. As additional background, canon 116 distinguishes between public juridic persons
and private juridic persons. Two important distinctions require explanation if we are to un-
derstand that differentiation. First, apostolic undertakings often require the combined ef-
forts of various individuals over their collective lifetimes. Like civil society, the Church
creates artificial entities known as "juridic persons" and recognizes their perpetual exis-
tence to afford continuity and stability for those undertakings. Ibid., 155. As perpetual and
artificial entities, juridic persons enjoy a legal life beyond that of any of the natural persons
who might constitute them. In that sense, juridic persons resemble corporations in civil so-
ciety. Ibid.; see also Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 299. Canon law gives these ju-
ridic persons certain rights and binds them to various obligations. 1983 code c. 113, §2. By
comparison, natural persons-whether considered individually or collectively-enjoy no
rights and face no obligations beyond what they experience as individuals. Kealy, 297.
Second, a public juridic person essentially differs from a private juridic person in its
relationship to the Church's hierarchy in at least two important ways. Initially, ecclesias-
tical authority forms and closely governs a public juridic person. In that regard, a public
juridic person typically originates when a competent ecclesiastical authority establishes
the organization. By comparison, a private juridic person arises when the private right of
association motivates various members of the faithful to come together for a specific pur-
pose. Kennedy, 161-162; see also Kealy, 302. Secondly, private juridic persons enjoy
more autonomy in their governance, even though subject to ecclesiastical authority in cer-
tain respects. Kennedy, 162. Accordingly, public juridic persons act "in the name of the
Church" because only those persons whom the Church commissions to act in its name can
genuinely so act. 1983 code c. 116, § 1; see also Kennedy, 161-162. In contrast, a private
juridic person can act only in its own name and not in the name of the Church. Ibid., 162.
As a potential third distinction, the competent ecclesiastical authority entrusts a
public juridic person with a specific task to support the public good. By comparison, the
public good may provide only a secondary concern for a private juridic person. See Kealy,
302.
43 Kennedy, "Physical and Juridic Persons," 154; see also Kealy, Diocesan Financial
Support, 304-305.
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bishop's power regarding the public exercise of divine worship and in
matters regarding the care of souls or other works of the apostolate.44 If
the diocesan bishop, however, entrusts the apostolic care of a diocesan
parish or institution to a religious institute or apostolic society, the parish
or institution typically remains subject to the bishop's governance and,
therefore, to taxation under canon 1263.
Regardless of the exact parameters of the term "public juridic person,"
a key question arises in its application: must the bishop impose the ordi-
nary tax on all public juridic persons equally or may he distinguish a cer-
tain class or type of juridic person?45 Kealy has defensibly concluded
that a bishop may impose a tax only on the members of a certain class, as
long as the bishop observes "natural equity."
46
3. Based upon "Income"
Canon 1263 expressly limits the ordinary tax to levies based upon "in-
come," but does not specify how the diocesan bishop should or must de-
termine the "income" to which the diocesan tax or assessment applies.
This article will refer to that income subject to tax as "assessable in-
come." In any event, a diocesan bishop must define or establish a
methodology for determining that assessable income, a process that re-
quires the bishop to address and resolve certain fundamental questions.47
Even though the code does not specifically address whether the bishop
must base a diocesan tax or assessment exclusively on income, commen-
tators agree that the code prohibits per capita taxes and the small fixed
amounts called the cathedraticum.48
a. Determination of Assessable Income
In defining assessable income, a bishop must first decide what
amounts to include in what this article terms "otherwise reportable in-
come." Next, the bishop must spell out which exclusions or deductions,
if any, the public juridic person can subtract from otherwise reportable
income to calculate assessable income. Although the NDLS survey de-
44 See 1983 code cc. 586, 594, 678; see also Kealy, "Taxation," 81.
45 Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 332; see also idem, "Taxation," 81.
46 Ibid. Kealy, however, does not define or explain the term "natural equity." For a dis-
cussion of that term, see John J. Coughlin, "Canonical Equity," Studia Canonica 30
(1996) 423, who addresses the meaning of "equity," "natural equity," and "canonical eq-
uity" in the 1983 code.
47 Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 81.
48 See infra, notes 78-81 and accompanying text for further information and discus-
sion about these prohibited practices.
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scribed in more detail in part II did not specifically ask how the dioceses
define assessable income, the responses document that the bishops in the
United States use a wide variety of methods to determine assessable
income.
Taxation systems often influence behavior. Bishops and the faithful
should keep in mind, therefore, that any exclusions or deductions under-
lying the computation of assessable income can encourage the public ju-
ridic persons in their dioceses, especially parishes, to engage in desired
activities or to fund certain programs-or not. That is, such provisions
can potentially discourage otherwise desirable activities or programs.
Two other preliminary considerations merit mention at this time. First,
to eliminate ambiguity and to ensure consistency any tax decree should
specify what method of accounting applies to compute assessable in-
come. Most dioceses appear to use the cash method to compute diocesan
taxes or assessments. Under the cash method, a parish would not report
income until received and would wait until actually paying expenses to
subtract them in determining assessable income. Under the accrual
method, by comparison, the parish would report income when pledged or
earned and deduct expenses when incurred. The fact that a pledge could
require a parish to pay a tax long before the contributor satisfies the
pledge helps to explain why most dioceses use the cash method for
diocesan taxes.
Second, the taxing decree should also specify what period the diocese
will use to calculate assessable income and how often the diocese will
expect public juridic persons to remit the taxes and assessments. In at
least one diocese, the bishop uses average assessable income over a five-
year period to determine the amount subject to tax.49 Policies, however,
vary. To compute the tax, dioceses may direct parishes to use actual, bud-
geted, or otherwise estimated income and expenses for the current peri-
od, whether a month or a year; the actual or estimated amounts from the
previous period; 50 or the actual sums from the second preceding peri-
od;5 1 or some combination of these alternatives. 52 In some dioceses,
parishes must remit the tax on a monthly basis.53 Other dioceses may
49 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response No. 85.
50 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response No. 52.
51 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response No. 8.
52 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response No. 36. This diocese used the previous month's
actual revenue, the previous month's actual expenses for some items, and the average
monthly budgeted annual school expense and debt service for the current fiscal year.
53 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 17 and 77.
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allow quarterly installments, 54 or even semi-annual or annual pay-
ments.
55
i. Otherwise Reportable Income
As a starting point, the bishop must decide exactly what revenues and
any other amounts to treat as "otherwise reportable income" before any
exclusions or deductions. Should the term "otherwise reportable in-
come" mean: (1) all cash or other receipts, (2) all cash or other receipts
except enumerated exclusions-a so-called "nonexcludable receipts"
approach, (3) only certain listed items of so-called "includable receipts,"
or (4) some other measure? Do any special circumstances in the diocese
involving more than one juridic person suggest that the bishop attempt to
clarify exactly which entity must include an amount as otherwise re-
portable income in certain situations? 56 Should the term otherwise re-
portable income include some adjustment for any assets that might in-
crease the public juridic person's ability to pay the tax or assessment? 57
Again, diversity in practice exists across the dioceses in the United
States. Some dioceses broadly define otherwise reportable income, using
terminology such as "all contributions and church income;" 58 "all in-
come from wha[t]ever source; '59 "all parish receipts;" 60 "gross income,"
54 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 10 and 38.
55 Dioceses that assign mandatory goals, quotas, or targets for their annual appeals
seemingly collect any deficiencies on an annual basis.
56 Because the tax under canon 1263 applies only to public juridic persons subject to
the bishop's authority, a public juridic person subject to the tax may try to shift income to
a "related" public juridic person not subject to the bishop's authority, a "related" private
juridic person, or to a public juridic person subject to a lower tax rate. For example, the
church for a university operated by a religious order that enjoys autonomy of governance
from the local bishop may also serve a diocesan parish that remains subject to the bishop's
authority. In such a situation, the allocation of revenues and related expenses between the
university and the parish could affect the parish's otherwise reportable income subject to
the diocesan tax. See supra, notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
57 In response to the NDLS survey, one diocese reported that parishes must add twen-
ty percent of certain year-end investments to "parish income" to calculate "adjusted in-
come." NDLS Survey Response No. 52. Another diocese requires parishes with elemen-
tary schools to add total cash in the school account at year-end to determine adjusted
income. NDLS Survey Response No. 71.
58 NDLS Survey Response No. 10.
59 NDLS Survey Response No. 23. This diocese later deducts certain fixed amounts
for students at the parochial school, at a consolidated school, and in the religious educa-
tion program.
60 NDLS Survey Response No. 16. This diocese's tax program, however, specifically
states that "ordinary school income is not taxed."
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an amount that specifically includes school tuition; 61 "total ordinary in-
come;" 62 "total parish receipts;" 63 or "total revenue," another label that
specifically includes tuition.64 Other dioceses, in turn, exclude school
revenues from an otherwise expansive definition. 65 Income under such a
broad definition would include bequests; investment income; net pro-
ceeds from fund-raising efforts, including bingo and other gambling rev-
enue; gains from the sale of property; grants; and rebates from the dio-
cese's annual appeal.66 This more inclusive definition of income should
not encompass loan distributions, rebates, reimbursements of current ex-
penses, or transfers;67 probably would not include Mass stipends; 68 and
might not include insurance settlements.
69
Some dioceses tax only Sunday collections 70 or Sunday and Holy Day
collections. 71 At least one diocese adds school tuition to Sunday collec-
tions and unrestricted gifts to compute its tax base.
72
ii. Exclusions and Deductions
After defining otherwise reportable income, the bishop must consider
what, if any, exclusions or deductions a public juridic person may sub-
tract in computing assessable income subject to tax. At least one other
commentator has concluded that any diocesan tax or assessment should
not simply operate as a tax on gross receipts, reasoning that fairness re-
quires a bishop to consider other factors affecting a juridic person's fi-
nancial situation and ability to pay. 73
Assuming that an item falls within the definition of otherwise re-
portable income, canon 1263 implicitly allows the bishop to exclude
61 NDLS Survey Response No. 32. This diocesan policy then allows all educational
expenses as a deduction.
62 NDLS Survey Response No. 20. This amount specifically includes "ordinary school
income." The formula later allows a parish to deduct one-half of school expenses.
63 NDLS Survey Response No. 18. This diocese subsequently allows a deduction for
school receipts.
64 NDLS Survey Response No. 36. This diocese allows a later adjustment for school
expenses.
65 See supra, note 60.
66 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 10, 32, 36, and 46.
67 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 10, 16, and 32.
68 See supra, note 20.
69 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 10, 16, and 46.
70 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 50, 63, and 67.
71 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 6, 43, and 77.
72 See NDLS Survey Response No. 26.
73 See Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 335.
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amounts arising from special collections, school tuition, capital cam-
paigns, bequests, contributions in kind, contributions to or transfers from
building funds, insurance settlements, or other sources from assessable
income subject to tax.74 Similarly, a bishop could allow various deduc-
tions in computing the public juridic person's assessable income. For ex-
ample, the bishop could exclude poorer parishes from the tax by provid-
ing a standard deduction, 75 say $100,000 per year, which would
effectively subject only those parishes with assessable income above that
amount to the tax under canon 1263. In addition, the bishop could allow
deductions for amounts used to support parish, regional, or diocesan
schools; payments to service debt obligations; or other qualifying expen-
ditures, such as costs for capital improvements or additions. 76 These ex-
clusions and deductions both reduce the amount of assessable income.
But adjustments to otherwise reportable income can also work the other
way. Perhaps in an effort to close a loophole under canon law, at least two
dioceses require parishes to add certain deposits or investments to other-
wise reportable income in computing the amount of assessable income.
77
Because canon 1263 requires any diocesan tax or assessment to qual-
ify as "proportionate to income," canon law does not expressly authorize
the bishop to consider a taxpayer's assets in determining the ability to
pay. A parish with little current income, but significant wealth, enjoys the
ability to pay taxes. For this reason, the next revision of the code should
specifically authorize diocesan taxes or assessments based on ability to
pay, rather than income alone. In determining whether a parish enjoys
significant wealth or ability to pay, canon law should allow the bishop to
exclude certain assets, such as churches, schools, separate funds estab-
lished to replace or maintain such facilities, or illiquid assets, either par-
tially or in their entirety.
b. Certain Prohibited Practices
Notwithstanding considerable flexibility about the definition of "in-
come," canon 1263 prohibits two practices that bishops might otherwise
use to compute a diocesan tax or assessment because they do not qualify
as "proportionate to income." First, the 1983 code prevents a bishop from
imposing a cathedraticum,78 which traditionally refers to a small fixed
74 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 9, 10, 16, 32, and 46.
75 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 7 and 57.
76 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 7, 14, 20, 23, 38, and 41.
77 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 52 and 71.
78 For more history about the cathedraticum, see supra, note 20, which observes that
in his intervention before the Revision Commission, Cardinal Krol relied upon custom,
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amount, say ten dollars, that a parish and its pastor paid annually to the
diocesan bishop as a sign that they subjected themselves to his gover-
nance. Canon 1504 of the 1917 code expressly authorized this cathe-
draticum. The 1983 code, however, particularly canon 1263, superseded
the old canon 1504. 79 Under the 1983 code, the tax under canon 1263
supplies that same act of subjection, but also conveys participation and
expresses communio.80 In other words, by paying the diocesan tax, a
parish signifies its participation in a larger community, namely the dio-
cese, within the universal Church and recognizes its dependence within
that larger body.
Second, canon 1263 does not allow per capita taxes, or assessments
that levy a fixed amount on each person or taxpayer subject to the exac-
tion. Because canon 1263 requires diocesan taxes and assessments to
qualify as "proportionate to income," that language disqualifies any sys-
tem that bases the tax, whether in whole or in part, on the number of
parishioners, families, envelope holders, contributing parishioners or
families, or students in the diocesan schools.
8 1
4. Requirements for Tax Rates-Moderate and Proportionate to Income
Beyond the requirement that the bishop base any diocesan tax or as-
sessment under canon 1263 on income, that canon expressly imposes
two additional limitations regarding tax rates. Under canon law, any or-
dinary tax must qualify as both moderate and proportionate to income.
82
In addition, this article argues that the policies underlying canon 1263
dictate that only differences in ability to pay should justify variances in
tax rates.
a. Moderate
According to Kealy, the adjective "moderate" requires that the tax
qualify as reasonable in relation to the economic situation of the parish
rather than a specific provision in the 1917 code, to justify a moderate and proportionate
diocesan tax found in many dioceses in the United States and in other regions at that time.
Kealy, "Diocesan Financial Report," 327: "In many dioceses in the United States ofAmer-
ica and in other regions, there is the legitimate custom of a moderate and proportionate
diocesan tax ... ;" see also Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 73, n. 25.
79 Kealy, "Taxation," 89.
80 Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 80.
81 Kealy, "Taxation," 77, 90 (case 13); see also Code of Canon Law Annotated, 780.
82 See supra, note 17 and accompanying text.
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or public juridic persons subject to the tax. 83 Kealy has opined that "a
thirty percent tax on parish income would not be moderate." 84 Another
leading, but somewhat dated, commentary predicts that the "specific tra-
ditions and the degrees of centralization of certain functions and services
in each diocese will help provide the context in which [the term] 'mod-
erate' will be interpreted. '85 As a corollary, the level of the tax raises im-
portant questions about the degree of centralization or decentralization
within the diocese and the relationship between the diocese and its
parishes, issues that affect the life of that particular church. 86 Presum-
ably, both the finance council and the presbyteral council will help to de-
fine what qualifies as "moderate" within each diocese. Less ideally, the
USCCB or a more local conference such as a provincial council might
establish national or regional norms.
b. Proportionate to Income
When tax professionals use the term "proportionate," they usually
refer to a flat tax.87 Given Catholic social teaching, however, an obvious
question arises: does canon 1263 authorize progressive taxation? 88 The
83 Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 334.
84 See Kealy, "Taxation," 90 (case 14).
85 Myers, "Temporal Goods of the Church," 866. This commentary observes that
canon 1356 of the 1917 code used a maximum amount of five percent for the seminary tax,
but also notes that canonists dispute the base for figuring that tax.
86 See Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 78-81.
87 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, "Social Welfare and the Rate
Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation," California Law Review 75 (1987) 1908,
noting that "under a proportionate, or 'flat,' tax, the percentage of income paid to the gov-
ernment remains constant as income rises;" Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., "The
Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation," University of Chicago Law Review 19 (1952) 419:
"a proportionate tax, for example on income, is one which taxes each dollar of income at
the same rate regardless of the total income of the taxpayer ... ;" Donna M. Byrne, "Pro-
gressive Taxation Revisited," Arizona Law Review 37 (1995) 744; Marjorie E. Korn-
hauser, "Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax," Fordham Urban Law Journal 23
(1996) 607.
88 As noted earlier, see supra, note 3, the term "progressive" can describe changes in
either marginal or effective tax rates. The marginal tax rate refers to percentage imposed
on the last increment, typically a dollar, of taxable income. By comparison, dividing the
total amount of tax by the total income determines the effective, or average, rate. Increas-
ing marginal rates always produce progressive effective rates. In addition, however, grant-
ing an exemption to all taxpayers in a system that uses a single or flat rate automatically
produces a progression of effective tax rates. Once taxpayers' incomes exceed the exemp-
tion amount, a progressively larger fraction becomes subject to tax. In essence, the effec-
tive rates in such a system vary from zero percent at all incomes up to the exemption
amount to a rate that approaches, but never quite reaches, the single flat rate as income
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commentators seem to agree that a bishop could impose progressive tax
rates under the canon.89 Robert T. Kennedy, the author of the leading
American commentary on Book V of the Code of Canon Law, states that
"nothing would appear to preclude the tax from being a graduated in-
come tax."90 Such graduated rates, coupled with spending policies that
benefit the poor-or at least do not benefit wealthy parishes-would
allow the bishop to redistribute financial resources from wealthy parish-
es to poorer ones and from richer dioceses to more destitute dioceses.
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c. Other Practices Regarding Computation of Diocesan Taxes
As discussed earlier, a bishop enjoys broad discretion to allow exclu-
sions and deductions to reduce the amount of assessable income and to
establish various tax rates based upon ability to pay in computing the un-
derlying tax. The NDLS survey, however, also reveals that dioceses use a
wide variety of other provisions unrelated to the ability to pay to compute
the tax after the determination of assessable income. Those provisions
approaches infinity. Blum and Kalven, "Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation," 420.
Commentators have sometimes referred to such a flat tax with an exemption as a "degres-
sive tax." See, e.g., Byrne, "Progressive Taxation Revisited," 744; Marjorie E. Korn-
hauser, "The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Re-
action," Michigan Law Review 86 (1987) 470.
89 Kealy argues that "Neither the wording of the canon nor equity would prevent the
imposition of a graduated tax, with wealthier juridic persons paying a higher proportion of
their income than poorer ones." Kealy, "Taxation," 82; see also idem, Diocesan Financial
Support, 335. The leading text on canon law in Great Britain and Ireland states that a bish-
op could also decide to use a sliding scale in proportion to revenue. Morrisey, in Letter &
Spirit, 713. If the bishop decides to choose a progressive tax, he should consult with the fi-
nance council and the presbyteral council about the various tax rates and the thresholds for
each rate. See infra, notes 106-114 and accompanying text.
90 Kennedy, "Book V," 1463.
91 A progressive tax with the money spent mostly on richer parishes would redistrib-
ute income the wrong way; in contrast, a flat tax with the money spent mostly on the poor
would produce a progressive system overall. See infra, notes 155-156 and accompanying
text.
In this regard, canon 1274, §3 sets forth the obligation of richer dioceses to help
poorer ones. Kealy writes: "Bishops should bear it in mind that in the expenditure of ec-
clesiastical resources they must take into account the needs not only of their own dioceses
but of other individual churches, since they too form part of the one Church of Christ. Let
it be their care also to give help according to their resources when other dioceses or regions
are afflicted by disaster." Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 249, quoting Christus
Dominus [ 6: AAS 58 (1966) 676, trans. in Documents of Vatican II, ed. Austin P. Flannery
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975) 567.
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include different tax rates, 92 tax credits, 93 or caps 94 for parishes support-
ing schools, owing debts over a certain amount, or satisfying other crite-
ria. Such provisions encourage parishes to adopt certain programs or to
engage in various activities in an effort to influence behavior. For exam-
ple, one diocese imposes an additional one percent tax on parishes whose
parishioners do not subscribe to the diocesan newspaper.95 Although
canon 1263 gives the bishop wide discretion to allow tax deductions for
such expenditures, this article questions whether any credit-which
would reduce the diocesan tax or assessment on a dollar-for-dollar
basis--can pass muster under canon law, given that canon 1263 requires
such taxes be "proportionate to [the parishes'] income."
5. The Needs of the Diocese
To determine what "the needs of the diocese ' 96 means, a bishop might
turn to canon 1254, the first provision in Book V of the 1983 code on the
Church's temporal goods. That canon states that the proper purposes for
the Church's ownership of temporal goods principally include: "to order
divine worship, to care for the decent support of the clergy and other
92 For example, several dioceses impose lower tax rates on parishes that operate and
support schools. See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 31, 66, and 67. The bishop in one
diocese has exempted parishes that subsidize their own parish school from an upcoming
increase in the diocesan assessment rate, effective July 1, 2003. NDLS Survey Response
No. 75. Other dioceses impose various tax rates on different types of income. See, e.g.,
NDLS Survey Response No. 69, imposing a lower tax rate on unrestricted amounts from
wills or bequests; NDLS Survey Response No. 71, subjecting bequests to a higher tax rate
than other income, but exempting bequests from assessments for high schools and clergy
care and wellness. Finally, several dioceses offer lower tax rates to parishes that partici-
pate in, or impose higher tax rates on parishes that fail to participate in, various diocesan
programs. See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response No. 5, offering a half-percent lower rate if a
parish uses the diocesan cash management program; NDLS Survey Response No. 23, im-
posing an additional one percent rate if thirty-five percent of parishioners do not subscribe
to the diocesan newspaper.
93 Several dioceses allow credits, which reduce taxes due on a dollar-for-dollar basis,
for debt service payments, school expenditures, contributions to the Catholic Charities
fund drive, or fixed amounts for each pastoral minister. See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response
Nos. 29, 42, and 66. One of these dioceses imposes minimum effective tax rates for both
parishes that support and do not support a school. NDLS Survey Response No. 42.
94 The responses from a handful of dioceses noted that they cap the current year's as-
sessment based on the largest billed assessment for the last two years, to prevent the as-
sessment from increasing or dropping by more than a certain percentage in any given year.
See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 38, 47,52, 54, 71, and 84.
95 NDLS Survey Response No. 23.
96 1983 codec. 1263.
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ministers; and to exercise works of the sacred apostolate and of charity,
especially toward the needy."97 As a result, diocesan needs would in-
clude, for example, the costs of administering the diocese; funding the
diocese's spiritual, pastoral, social service, and educational programs;
operating a matrimonial tribunal; supporting the poor or struggling
parishes, especially within the diocese; financing the Church's events
and organizations on both the national and international levels; and aid-
ing missions. 98 Diocesan needs obviously depend upon the level of ser-
vices and support that the diocese either provides or aspires to provide.
In that regard, the diocesan budget should indicate the needs the bishop
plans to address.
99
Various texts from Vatican II and several provisions in canon law sup-
port the conclusion that a diocese's spiritual and financial obligations
include the poor, whether inside the diocese or elsewhere in the
world. 100 In particular, both Lumen gentium and Christus Dominus call
bishops, dioceses, churches, and the faithful to solidarity in financial
matters.10 1 Lumen gentium states that "bishops, in a universal fellow-
ship of charity, should gladly extend their fraternal aid to other
churches, especially to neighboring and more needy dioceses in accor-
dance with the venerable example of antiquity." 10 2 Christus Dominus
reminds bishops that when "administering ecclesiastical property, [they
should think] of the needs not only of their own dioceses but also of the
other particular churches, for they are also a part of the one Church of
Christ."10 3 Implementing these instructions, canon 1271 recognizes a
diocese's obligation to contribute to the support of the Apostolic See.
104
97 1983 code c. 1254, §2
98 Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 326-327, citing Cardinal Krol's intervention in
support of canon 1263 at the October 1981 plenary meeting of the Revision Commission;
see also Morrisey, in Letter & Spirit, 712, n. 3.
99 Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 81. In addition, the bishop should provide to the faith-
ful of the diocese an accounting of the taxes collected and amounts spent.
100 See generally Garrett J. Roche, "The Poor and Temporal Goods in Book V of the
Code," The Jurist 55 (1995) 299.
101 Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 248-250.
102 Lumen gentium 1 23, in The Sixteen Documents of Vatican I, ed. Marianne Lorri-
ane Trouv6 (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1999) 150.
103 Christus Dominus 6, in Trouv6, 274. The text continues: "Finally, they should di-
rect their attention, according to their means, to the relief of disasters by which other dio-
ceses and regions are affected." See also Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 249.
104 1983 code c. 1271: "By reason of the bond of unity and charity and according to the
resources of their dioceses, bishops are to assist in procuring those means which the
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In addition, canon 1274 sets forth the obligations of richer dioceses to
support poor ones. 1
05
6. Consultation
The bishop must consult with both the diocesan finance council' 0 6 and
the entire presbyteral council 10 7 before imposing a tax under canon
1263.108 The bishop's failure to consult with either body invalidates a tax
and would presumably relieve those persons subject to the tax from the
obligation to pay it.109 On the other hand, if the bishop listens to the fi-
nance and presbyteral councils and takes their advice seriously, those
bodies will more likely support the ultimate policy. "10
Canon 1263 requires "consultation," not "consent." Under canon 127,
a valid consultation requires the bishop: (1) to convoke both the finance
council and the presbyteral council to discuss the matter; (2) to provide
information necessary to reach an informed judgment from each council;
(3) to seek advice from all present; and (4) to listen to the advice. 1 '1
Kennedy suggests that the counsel sought should include the genuine-
ness and relative importance of the diocesan need underlying the pro-
posed tax, the appropriate meaning of the "moderate" requirement under
Apostolic See needs, according to the conditions of the times, so that it is able to offer ser-
vice properly to the universal Church." See also Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 347.
105 1983 code c. 1274, §3: "Insofar as necessary, each diocese is to establish a common
fund through which bishops are able to satisfy obligations towards other persons who
serve the Church and meet the various needs of the diocese and through which the richer
dioceses can also assist the poorer ones."
106 At least one commentary describes this body as the council for economic affairs.
Lopez Alarc6n, in Code of Canon Law Annotated, 781.
107 Several commentators also call this body the council of priests. Ibid. The leading
commentary in the United States notes that canon 1263 requires the bishop to involve the
entire presbyteral council, not just the college of consultors as in canon 1277 (ordinary and
extraordinary administration by diocesan bishop) or canon 1292 (restricted alienation).
Kennedy, "Book V," 1464.
108 In addition, Kennedy suggests that the bishop may want to consult the diocesan pas-
toral council, if one exists, plus the superiors of any religious institutes of diocesan right
and the representatives of any other categories of public juridic persons that the bishop
contemplates taxing. Kennedy, "Book V," 1464.
109 Ibid., 1463.
110 Frug6, "Diocesan Taxation," 81.
111 See Kealy, "Taxation," 80, citing canon 127; see also idem, Diocesan Financial
Support, 331.
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the circumstances, the definition of the income subject to the tax, the pro-
posed tax's rates,112 its duration, and the process, if any, for appealing
any determinations involving the tax. 113
Finally, canon 127 stipulates that the bishop should not act contrary to
the advice given unless he concludes that there is an overriding reason
for so doing. 114 This article respectfully suggests that, whenever reason-
ably possible in such a situation, the bishop should also articulate his
overriding reason, especially given the circumstances in the early 2000s
when both the laity and others are calling for more transparency in both
administrative decisions and financial reporting.
B. Extraordinary Taxes
Canon 1263 allows the diocesan bishop to impose "an extraordinary
and moderate exaction upon other physical and juridic persons in case of
grave necessity and under the same conditions" as the so-called ordinary
tax, but "without prejudice to particular laws and customs" that might
give him greater rights. Ignoring the "particular laws and customs" ex-
ception for the moment, a "moderate" extraordinary tax can apply during
"grave necessity," which suggests a limited duration, to "other physical
and juridic persons" if the bishop also satisfies the "under the same con-
ditions" requirement. Unfortunately, canon 1263 does not specify exact-
ly which of the other unmentioned conditions for the so-called ordinary
tax, namely the "subject to governance," "proportionate to income," and
"consultation" prerequisites, fall within the "under the same conditions"
requirement for the extraordinary tax. Although not expressly labeled as
extraordinary taxes, the responses to the NDLS survey suggest that at
least a few dioceses in the United States currently impose such exactions
to fund an unfunded liability in the diocese's defined benefit plan or to
pay for retirement housing for priests. 1
5
112 If the bishop proposes a progressive tax, the consultation should include "the vari-
ous levels and percentages to be used." Kennedy, "Book V," 1463.
113 Kennedy opines that a single consultation at the time of a tax's original imposition
seemingly does not satisfy the consultation requirement's intent. As a result, that text en-
courages the bishop to repeat consultation before renewing an annual or otherwise regu-
larly recurring tax. Ibid. Such continuing consultation seems wise since the circumstances
relevant to a particular tax can change.
114 1983 codec. 127, §2.
115 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 8, 26, and 73.
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1. Grave Necessity
Both the terms "extraordinary" and "grave necessity" suggest that a
diocesan bishop may not regularly impose this exaction for recurring
diocesan operations. This constraint dictates that the bishop restrict any
extraordinary exactions to a limited duration. The commentators agree
that canon law intended this provision for a particular need, specific pur-
pose, or during an unusual set of circumstances. 116 For example, the dio-
cese may need the revenues to pay the expenses related to a papal visit,
build or repair a cathedral or seminary, or, more recently, to pay legal fees
or damages arising from sexual abuse cases. 117 In addition, the grave ne-
cessity requirement indicates that the need for an extraordinary tax must
qualify as particularly urgent and important. Kennedy also interprets
grave necessity as requiring that the ordinary sources of income will not
suffice. 118
2. Other Physical and Juridic Persons
Unlike the ordinary tax, which only applies to "public juridic persons
subject to his governance," the bishop may also impose an extraordinary
tax both on private juridic persons t l9and on physical persons. 120 An am-
biguity, certainly in the English translation, suggests that the extraordi-
nary tax could potentially apply to persons, whether individuals or pri-
vate and public juridic persons, not subject to the bishop's governance. 121
As a practical matter, the absence of a clarifying interpretation precludes
116 Kennedy, "Book V," 1464; see also Myers, "Temporal Goods of the Church," 866.
117 See Morrisey, in Letter & Spirit, 713.
118 Kennedy, "Book V," 1464.
119 See supra, note 42.
120 In contrast to the subsidium caritativum in canon 1505 of the 1917 code (see supra,
note 20), canon 1263 does not restrict the extraordinary tax to those persons possessing a
benefice. Myers, "Temporal Goods of the Church," 865.
121 Kennedy, "Book V," 1464-1465. For example, canon law grants autonomy of gov-
ernance to religious institutes and apostolic societies, including institutes and societies
that a pope may have created. See supra, note 44 and accompanying text.
Under one interpretation, the bishop could not lawfully impose an extraordinary tax
on religious institutes and apostolic societies of pontifical right and their schools and hos-
pitals because they fall outside the bishop's governance under canon law. See Kealy, "Tax-
ation," 78, 90 (case 16); see also Lopez Alarc6n, in Code of Canon Law Annotated, 781.
On the other hand, canon 264, which allows the bishop to impose a tax to support a dioce-
san seminary, specifically authorizes a levy on juridic persons that have established a pres-
ence in the diocese in certain circumstances, even though canon law does not otherwise
subject those persons to the bishop's governance. Kennedy, "Book V," 1464, n. 43; see
also Myers, "Temporal Goods of the Church," 865.
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a bishop from levying an extraordinary tax on any person not subject to
his governance because canon 14 would allow that person to treat the tax
as "doubtfully valid and, hence, not binding."'
122
3. Under the Same Conditions
Canon law scholars uniformly agree that the phrase "under the same
conditions" requires the bishop to consult with the finance council and
the presbyteral council before imposing an extraordinary tax. 123 In the
previous paragraph, this article briefly considered whether the "subject
to governance" condition applies to extraordinary taxes. Even more rel-
evant to this article, two commentators specifically state that an extraor-
dinary tax must satisfy the "proportionate to income" requirement.
124
From a practical standpoint, an extraordinary tax based on wealth would
again raise a "doubtfully valid" concern that would excuse payment until
an authentic interpretation provides otherwise. 25 Once more, however,
both income and wealth affect a person's ability to pay any tax, especial-
ly an extraordinary exaction. 126 On this view, an authentic interpretation
should construe the phrase "under the same conditions" narrowly, so as
not to include the "proportionate to their income" requirement. For this
reason, the next revision of the code should specifically allow diocesan
taxes or assessments, especially extraordinary exactions, based on abili-
ty to pay, rather than income alone. Such an amendment would allow a
more holistic approach to diocesan taxation of any parishes or other tax-
able persons in the "asset rich, income poor" category.
4. Other Particular Laws and Customs
The final clause in canon 1263 contains another ambiguity, this one in-
volving diocesan laws and customs. The language "without prejudice to
particular laws and customs attributing greater powers to him" could
convey more extensive taxing power to a diocesan bishop, certainly as to
122 Kennedy, "Book V," 1465.
123 Kealy, "Taxation," 84; Kennedy, "Book V," 1464; Myers, "Temporal Goods of the
Church," 865; see also Lopez Alarc6n, in Code of Canon Law Annotated, 781; Morrisey,
in Letter & Spirit, 713.
124 Kennedy, "Book V," 1464; see also Lopez Alarc6n, in Code of Canon Law Annotat-
ed, 781.
125 See supra, note 122 and accompanying text.
126 See supra, note 73 and accompanying text.
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extraordinary taxes.'27 The most detailed explanation of the provision's
canonical history reports that after the Revision Commission's 1981 ple-
nary meeting, Pope John Paul II appointed a special six-member cardi-
nalatial commission to consider six canons, including canon 1263. The
final version he promulgated added the above-quoted phrase at the end of
the canon. 128 Kealy explains that in some regions, particularly Germany
and Austria, the state collected a church tax, not in the government's own
name, but as an agent for the Church. As a result, the dioceses in question
had to empower the civil authorities to collect the tax. Although he does
not explain how such an arrangement qualifies as an "extraordinary" tax
within the meaning of canon 1263, Kealy opines that this canon does not
allow new local legislation that grants broader powers to bishops, rea-
soning that such an interpretation would leave the restrictions in the
canon meaningless. 1
29
III. Actual Practices in the United States
As mentioned earlier, canonists agree that canon 1263 allows a bishop
to use tax rates that increase as assessable income rises. The question aris-
es, however, as to what extent, if any, the bishops in the United States have
used such progressive rates for diocesan taxes or assessments following
the promulgation of the 1983 code. A survey might supply the answer. Un-
fortunately, the only three surveys found that addressed the question were
done prior to 1983.130 The NDLS survey mentioned earlier indicates that
127 Interestingly, the Latin version of canon 1263 and earlier English translations used
a semicolon to separate the two exactions in the provision. See supra, note 17. The use of
a semicolon in canon 1263 enhances the possible argument that the exception for "partic-
ular laws and customs" also applies to the ordinary tax. Without explicitly using this ar-
gument, one commentator has argued that the last phrase in canon 1263 may permit par-
ticular law or custom to continue the use of the cathedraticum. Myers, "Temporal Goods
of the Church," 866. At that time, the leading translation in the United States used a semi-
colon to separate the two clauses in canon 1263. See supra, note 17. That same commen-
tary, however, acknowledged that "the cathedraticum as such was not normally part of the
life of the Church in the United States." Myers, 866.
128 Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 329-330, 338-339.
129 Kealy, "Taxation," 85.
130 In responding to the NDLS survey, several replies mentioned another survey that
the Diocese of Great Falls-Billings in Montana recently conducted (the "Great Falls-
Billings survey"). That 2001 survey documents that dioceses increasingly rely upon an-
nual appeals. Of the ninety-six dioceses that responded to the Great Falls-Billings survey,
eighty-eight, or almost 91.7 percent, obtained an average of 34.6 percent of their revenue
from annual appeals. Although the survey does not specifically address the question, the
data suggests that annual appeals provide the greatest source of revenue for the respond-
ing dioceses. E-mail from Joe Pipinich, Stewardship, Diocese of Great Falls-Billings, to
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the bishops who impose diocesan taxes or assessments in the United
States use flat rates almost four times more frequently than progressive
rates. The results from the NDLS survey update and mirror the findings
and conclusions in the earlier surveys.
A. The Notre Dame Law School Survey
The Appendix describes in considerable detail the methodology un-
derlying the NDLS survey. 13 1 Briefly, the survey used diocesan web
sites, short e-mail requests for information, and several telephone con-
versations in an effort to determine whether the geographical dioceses in
the fifty states and the District of Columbia used flat rates or progressive
rates to compute diocesan taxes or assessments. 132 The survey gathered
data about the actual practices in eighty-five geographic dioceses in the
United States. The information obtained comes from thirty-seven states
and all fourteen episcopal regions. 133 The survey results also reveal other
Patti J. Ogden, Research Librarian, Notre Dame Law School (April 23, 2003)[on file with
the author]. The Great Falls-Billings survey, however, does not address the flat versus pro-
gressive issue regarding tax rates. Ibid.
131 See infra, Appendix at 366-67.
132 At least six dioceses in the survey referred to amounts that the bishop required
parishes to pay, not as diocesan taxes or assessments, but as a "Management Service Fee,"
a "mandatory 'target,"' a "Parish Share goal," a "quota," or a "taxa." NDLS Survey Re-
sponse Nos. 22, 31, 52, 53, 64, and 70.
133 The USCCB divides the United States into fourteen geographic regions. United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S. Catholic Dioceses by State, at
http://www.usccb.org/state.htm, visited July 28, 2004 (hereafter "Bishops' Website").
Listed below are the states that comprise each region and, in parenthesis, the number of
dioceses within the region represented in the NDLS survey results.
Region 1: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut (5)
Region 2: New York (3)
Region 3: New Jersey, Pennsylvania (7)
Region 4: Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia (3)
Region 5: Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee (7)
Region 6: Michigan, Ohio (6)
Region 7: Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin (10)
Region 8: Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota (6)
Region 9: Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska (7)
Region 10: Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas (7)
Region 11: California, Hawaii, Nevada (7)
Region 12: Idaho, Montana, Alaska, Washington, Oregon (7)
Region 13: Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming (4)
Region 14: Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina (6)
NDLS Survey Response Nos. 1-78, 80-86.
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interesting data about the widely diverse diocesan taxation practices in
this country.
1. Flat versus Progressive Rates
Among the eighty-five dioceses providing information through one
means or another, twelve dioceses stated that their bishops do not impose
a diocesan tax, 134 leaving a sample of seventy-three dioceses that view
themselves as imposing at least one diocesan tax or assessment. 135 Fo-
cusing only on the subset of dioceses acknowledging a diocesan tax, only
fourteen dioceses' 36-- or less than twenty percent-reported using pro-
gressive tax rates. These fourteen dioceses come exclusively from the
mid-east, south, or southwest and Regions 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, and 14.131 Two
of those fourteen dioceses, however, also use flat rates to compute other
diocesan taxes or assessments. 138 Six, or almost half of the fourteen dio-
ceses with progressive tax rates, utilize non-incremental tax brackets. 1
39
134 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 1, 3,4, 11, 22, 28, 34, 37, 54, 62, 65, and 86.
135 Although this article accepts those responses as accurate for purposes of the analy-
sis that follows, reasonable minds could certainly disagree with the assertion that a
mandatory goal or target in an annual appeal does not qualify as a tax or assessment under
canon 1263. See supra, note 18. By any standard, assessments for diocesan schools or
priests' retirement programs fall under canon 1263. For a more detailed discussion about
these non-taxing dioceses, see infra, Appendix notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
136 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 9, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 39, 44, 46, 47, 50, 58, 59, and
72.
137 See supra, note 133.
138 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 18 and 44.
139 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 39, 44, 46, 50, 58, and 59. In a non-incremental sys-
tem, a fixed rate applies to all income in the respective tax bracket. For example, assume a
very simple progressive and non-incremental rate structure as follows:
Assessable Income Applicable Rate
Zero to $100,000 10%
Over $100,000 20%
Under this rate structure, a parish with exactly $100,000 in assessable income would owe
$10,000 ($100,000 x. 10) in diocesan tax. If the parish's income increased to $100,001,
the parish's diocesan tax would jump to $20,000.20 ($100,001 x .20). In this example, a
one dollar increase in assessable income (from $100,000 to $100,001) results in a
$10,000.20 jump in the parish's diocesan tax (from $10,000 to $20,000.20), a result that
violates both vertical and horizontal equity. See infra, note 244. By comparison, an incre-
mental system would apply a higher tax rate only to that income that falls within that
bracket. For example, assume a very simple progressive, but incremental, rate structure as
follows:
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One of the remaining eight dioceses even uses a tax rate schedule in
which the marginal rates begin at fifteen percent, increase to twenty-four
percent, but then fall until they reach nineteen percent. 140 Such a struc-
ture illustrates a "humpbacked" rate system or "bubble," in which some
taxpayers pay a higher marginal tax rate than others with higher taxable
incomes. 141
If we turn next to the fifty-nine dioceses using only non-progressive
rates, six seemingly violate the prohibition against per capita taxes by
basing diocesan assessments, in whole or in part, on the number of
parishioners, registered families, envelope holders or donors, or students
from the parish. 142 The remaining fifty-three dioceses in the NDLS sur-
vey-an overwhelming majority of those dioceses that consider them-
selves as imposing a diocesan tax-mention only "flat" rates for their
diocesan taxes or assessments. 143 Although comparisons require caution,
the flat tax rates in those fifty-three dioceses range from a low of one-half
of one percent to a high of 26.3 percent. 144 Significantly, however, the
Assessable Income Applicable Tax
Between Zero and $100,000 10% of the amount
Over $100,000 $10,000, plus 20% of the
amount over $100,000
Under this rate structure, a parish with exactly $100,000 in assessable income would owe
$10,000 ($100,000 x .10) in diocesan tax. If the parish's income increased to $100,001,
the parish's diocesan tax would increase to $10,000.20 [$10,000 + .2($100,001 -
$100,000)]. In this example, a one dollar increase in assessable income (from $100,000 to
$100,001) results in only twenty cent increase in the parish's diocesan tax (from $10,000
to $10,000.20).
140 NDLS Survey Response No. 72. Such a system, seemingly unjustly, places the
highest tax burden on "middle-income" parishes in the twenty-four percent bracket.
141 Alan Gunn and Larry D. Ward, Cases, Text and Problems on Federal Income Taxa-
tion, 5th ed., American Casebook Series (St. Paul: West Group, 2002) 8. Such a system
typically imposes progressive effective tax rates, even though the marginal rates are re-
gressive at higher levels of income. See supra, note 88. In other words, high-income tax-
payers nevertheless usually pay a larger percentage of their total taxable incomes than
middle-income taxpayers.
142 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 13, 21, 32, 40, 51, and 76. See supra, note 81 and ac-
companying text. One of these dioceses also imposes a flat tax on certain parishes. NDLS
Survey Response No. 40. In addition, at least three other dioceses base assessments or
mandatory goals in diocesan appeals on the number of registered families or contributors
in each parish. See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 1, 37, and 86.
143 In addition, several other dioceses use flat rates for various assessments. See supra,
note 138 and accompanying text; see also NDLS Survey Response Nos. 18, 44, and 86.
144 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 67 and 72. The lower rate applies to parishes that sup-
port a school either directly or by subsidy; parishes and missions in that particular diocese
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respondent from one diocese which uses a flat rate expressed an un-
awareness of any diocese with a progressive rate scheme.1
45
The following chart summarizes the findings of the NDLS survey re-
garding the seventy-three dioceses self-reporting a diocesan tax or as-
sessment:
Category Number Percentage
Exclusively Flat 53 72.6%
Any Progressive 14 19.2%
Per capita 6 8.2%
Totals 73 100.0%
Stated another way, the fifty-three dioceses that mention only flat tax
rates to impose diocesan taxes and assessments outnumber the fourteen
dioceses using any progressive rates for a diocesan tax or assessment by
an almost four-to-one ratio.
2. Other Practices
The information obtained from the eighty-five dioceses points to sev-
eral other interesting findings and conclusions. First, at least some dio-
ceses may not have reexamined their taxing practices since Pope John
Paul II promulgated the revised code in 1983. The response from one
diocese begins proudly, "We have a cathedraticum formula that has been
in place since 1976. ,146 Second, even though the 1983 code repealed the
that do not operate schools and do not support or provide a subsidy to a regional Catholic
school pay an assessment equal to one percent of regular Sunday offerings. Not knowing
exactly what income individual dioceses tax seriously limits comparability of the given
percentages. In particular, exclusions and deductions can exempt significant portions of
total parish income from actual taxation. If the latter diocese exempted 99.9 percent of
total parish income from taxation, the actual tax burden on parishes in that diocese may
fall below the levy on parishes in the former diocese. At some point, however, a diocesan
tax that exempts almost all income from taxation arguably ceases to be "proportionate to
their income." As another illustration, if offertory collections account for eighty percent of
the total parish income in a particular diocese, a flat ten percent tax rate in that diocese
would collect more revenue (specifically, eight percent of total parish income) than a flat
twenty percent tax rate in a system that allowed various exclusions and deductions that re-
duced the tax base to thirty percent of total parish income (translating to only six percent
of total parish income).
145 NDLS Survey Response No. 56.
146 NDLS Survey Response No. 66 (italics added).
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cathedraticum, at least nineteen dioceses continue to refer to diocesan
assessments as such. 14 7 Third, at least nine dioceses violate the prohibi-
tion against per capita taxes by basing diocesan taxes or assessments, ei-
ther in whole or in part, on the number of parishioners, registered fami-
lies, envelope holders or donors, or students from the parish. 148 Fourth,
when dioceses pass-through to the parishes costs arising from certain
diocesan programs, they may violate canon law if the bishop does not ob-
serve the requirements of canon 1263.149
Finally, the bishops in the United States continue to use a wide variety
of tax practices, including divergent definitions of assessable income, as-
sorted rates, and different credits and caps. 150 In fairness to the bishops
exclusively using flat rates, they typically grant standard deductions,
151
exclusions, 152 other deductions, 153 credits, 154 or subsidies to parishes in
need 155 in an effort to allocate equitably the costs of funding diocesan
programs, supporting poorer parishes in the diocese, and assisting the
147 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 2, 10, 17, 18, 19, 24, 26, 29, 30, 55, 59, 66, 68, 73, 75,
77, 82, 83, and 87; see also supra, notes 78-79 and accompanying text. One commentator
noted similar improper characterizations prior to the 1983 code. See Myers, "Temporal
Goods of the Church," 866; see also T. Lincoln Bouscaren and Adam C. Ellis, Canon Law:
A Text and Commentary, 3d rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1957) 787-788,
observing that the term cathedraticum does not accurately describe the tax that American
bishops levied before the 1983 code to support their dioceses. Because the 1983 code
abolishes the provision that allowed a bishop to collect the cathedraticum, under another
view the continued use of the misnomer does not matter.
148 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 1, 13, 21, 32, 37, 40, 51, 76, and 86. See supra, note
81 and accompanying text. Three of these dioceses do not consider themselves as impos-
ing diocesan taxes or assessments. NDLS Survey Response Nos. 1, 37, and 86; see also
supra, note 134.
149 See supra, note 15.
150 See supra, notes 49-77 and 92-94 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response Nos. 10 and 57. These standard deductions ar-
guably translate to a progressive tax rate structure by taxing the amount of income equal
to the standard deduction at a zero percent tax rate and all income above that amount at the
flat tax rate.
152 See supra, note 74 and accompanying text.
153 See supra, note 76 and accompanying text.
154 See supra, note 93 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., NDLS Survey Response No. 12. As a practical matter, subsidies from gen-
eral diocesan funds, especially in those dioceses that use flat tax rates, often provide need-
ed support for poorer parishes, sometimes allowing those parishes to remain in operation.
In some situations, a parish might even receive more in subsidies than it pays in diocesan
taxes and assessments, which would create a negative effective tax rate for the parish. Un-
fortunately, the existence or amounts of these subsidies may not be apparent from pub-
lished diocesan financial statements or reports.
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poor, the vulnerable, and the oppressed. 156 Other bishops attempt to con-
sider a parish's ability to pay by reducing flat tax rates for parishes that
operate or support schools' 57 or by requiring a parish to add certain de-
posits or investments to determine the amount of assessable income.'158
B. Earlier Surveys
If the NDLS survey results are in any way surprising, they are not
unique. In fact, they mirror and update the findings and conclusions of
three earlier surveys that predate the 1983 code. Shortly before its pro-
mulgation, Donald J. Frug6 analyzed the financial reports of thirteen dio-
ceses 159 in his 1982 dissertation about the taxation practices of bishops in
the United States (the "Frug6 Survey"). 160 Although incomplete infor-
mation precludes any definitive conclusions about the assessments in at
least two, and perhaps three, of those dioceses,161 the bishops in nine of
the remaining ten dioceses used flat rates ranging from three to fifteen
156 In fact, any serious analysis to determine whether a particular diocese uses a pro-
gressive, flat, or regressive approach to taxation must also consider the diocese's expendi-
tures. If a diocese uses the revenues from diocesan taxes and assessments that impose pro-
gressive rates in a way that favors richer parishes, the net result may actually resemble a
regressive system. In a regressive tax, the percentage of income paid falls as income in-
creases.
157 See supra, note 92 and accompanying text.
158 See supra, note 77 and accompanying text.
159 Based upon the public availability of financial statements, Msgr. Frug6 examined
one diocese from each of the thirteen regional divisions of the United States that the
USCCB then used for administrative purposes. Frug6, Taxation Practices, 110; see also
supra, note 133. The thirteen dioceses included: the Archdiocese of Hartford (Region 1),
the Diocese of Rockville Centre in New York (Region 2), the Diocese of Pittsburgh (Re-
gion 3), the Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston (Region 4), the Diocese of Birmingham (Re-
gion 5), the Archdiocese of Cincinnati (Region 6), the Archdiocese of Chicago (Region 7),
the Archdiocese of Saint-Paul and Minneapolis (Region 8), the Archdiocese of Kansas
City in Kansas (Region 9), the Diocese of Galveston-Houston (Region 10), the Diocese of
San Bernardino (Region 11), the Diocese of Helena (Region 12), and the Diocese of
Pueblo (Region 13). Frug, 111-129.
160 Frug6, Taxation Practices, 110.
161 Although the financial statements from Hartford and San Bernardino revealed rev-
enues from "Diocesan Assessments: Cathedraticum" and "Cathedraticum assessment on
parishes," respectively, Frug6 could not obtain information about the methods of comput-
ing those assessments. Frug6, Taxation Practices, 112, 126-127. In Pueblo, the Bishop's
Diocesan Fund had previously replaced former cathedraticum assessments. Ibid.,
128-129. The bishop assigned "mandatory goals based on a percentage rate of each
parish's income." Ibid., 129.
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percent to compute the diocesan assessment. 162 In the one exception, the
assessment ranged from two to 7.5 percent, depending upon the parish's
income. 163
Frug6's dissertation also discussed two slightly earlier surveys. 164 In
response to a resolution at its 1979 convention, the Board of Governors
of the Canon Law Society of America authorized a survey of the finan-
cial practices of the dioceses across the United States. 165 Reverend
Royce R. Thomas, chancellor of the Diocese of Little Rock, conducted
the unpublished survey (the "CLSA Survey"), which involved a ques-
tionnaire sent to all of the 162 dioceses or archdioceses in the United
States. 166 Among the 139 dioceses that responded, forty-seven purported
to impose a "'cathedraticum' in the classical sense of the term (a moder-
ate tax on the same amount paid by each parish once a year [under canon
1504 of the 1917 code])."'167 Upon closer examination, 168 however, the
CLSA Survey concluded that only one diocese imposed "a true cathe-
draticum, that is a moderate tax, the same for all."'169 That diocese levied
a $150 tax on each diocesan entity. 170 The remaining forty-six dioceses,
which purported to assess a cathedraticum, actually imposed taxes of
varying amounts, based upon some percentage of income. The CLSA
Survey found that some of these dioceses levied a flat percentage; other
dioceses computed the tax "as a percentage in proportion to the parish's
income." 71 The percentage rates ranged from one to sixteen percent. 172
162 The dissertation reported the following flat rates: Rockville Centre (eight percent);
Pittsburgh (sixteen percent, but with a planned decrease to fifteen percent); Wheeling-
Charleston (three percent); Birmingham (5.5 percent); Cincinnati (4.02 percent); Chicago
(5.75 percent); Saint-Paul and Minneapolis (7.5 percent); Kansas City (five percent, plus
negotiated assessments for the retirement of priests and the seminary); and Helena (7.5
percent). Ibid., 112-129. Although Frug6 does not specify any rate for Publeo, the use of
the article "a" before the words "percentage rate" suggests a flat rate for each parish's
mandatory goal for the Bishop's Diocesan Fund in that diocese, which would mean that
almost ninety-one percent (ten of eleven) of the dioceses sampled used a fiat rate. See
supra, note 161.
163 Frug6, Taxation Practices, 125, describing the methodology in Galveston-Houston.
164 Ibid., 129-133.
165 Ibid., 129.
166 Ibid., 129, n. 43.
167 Ibid., 130, 229.






In addition, one hundred dioceses reported "a parish assessment for
diocesan support, 'separate from the cathedraticum."' 73 These dioceses
sometimes used very complicated formulas for determining the taxable
bases and often allowed deductions for parishes with schools or debt.' 
74
In 1981, the Diocese of Alexandria-Shreveport conducted an unpub-
lished survey regarding the different methods that dioceses in the United
States used to assess parishes (the "Alexandria-Shreveport Survey"). 175
Frug6 reports that a questionnaire was sent to eighty-six randomly se-
lected dioceses, and seventy-six dioceses responded. 176 The accompany-
ing report concluded that thirty-six dioceses, or approximately forty-
seven percent of those responding, "use[d] a single tax rate on all
parishes or a single rate for parishes and another slightly lower rate for
missions."'177 Although thirty-two dioceses replied that they used differ-
ent rates to assess parishes, 178 Frug6's commentary on the survey does
not address whether those different rates depended upon the amount of
income, the type of income, the existence of a parish school, or other fac-
tors. The Alexandria-Shreveport survey, however, did find that eight dio-
ceses, or thirteen percent of the respondents, used what the report termed
"Variable 'Income Tax' Scales," presumably referring to progressive tax
rates. 179 These dioceses grouped parishes by income categories and
levied a percentage tax on the parishes in each group at rates ranging
from two to twenty-one percent of income. 180
173 Ibid., 130, 229. Ninety-eight dioceses also reported annual support drives in aldi-
tion to parish assessments. Twenty-two dioceses indicated that the bishop assigned
mandatory quotas in those appeals. Ibid., 130-131. The CLSA Survey also found other as-
sessments or support programs. Seventy-six dioceses required parishes to contribute to the
support of high schools, fifty-three dioceses imposed assessments for the diocesan news-
paper, and twenty-two dioceses mandated support for other programs, including seminar-





177 Ibid. The tax rates for this group ranged from five percent to eighteen percent, aver-
aging seven percent.
171 Ibid., 132. The remaining eight dioceses, accounting for ten percent of the respon-
dents, reported that they did not impose diocesan assessments. The report apparently stat-
ed that in these dioceses "'funding was realized through an annual appeal, each parish
having a mandatory goal assigned."' Ibid., 133 (emphasis added).
179 Ibid., 133.
"0 Ibid.
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Collectively, the NDLS and other surveys document that the diocesan
bishops in the United States primarily use flat tax rates to impose dioce-
san taxes and assessments.
IV Catholic Social Teaching on Distributive Justice and the Obligation for
the Well-Off to Help Support the Poor and Less Fortunate
The Roman Catholic tradition embraces the belief that the goods of
creation exist to serve the needs of all. 18 1 In that tradition, basic justice
imposes specific obligations on everyone who enjoys greater re-
sources. 182 Catholic social teaching identifies three dimensions of basic
justice,' 8 3 namely commutative justice,184 distributive justice,i1 5 and so-
cial justice.18 6 Most relevant to this topic, distributive justice recognizes
that human existence requires a minimum amount of material resources.
Distributive justice obliges the entire human community to help fulfill
the poor's basic needs unless an absolute scarcity precludes such sup-
port. Almost twenty years ago, the U.S. bishops concluded that no such
scarcity exists in our country.187 Earlier, in Gaudium et spes, Vatican II
181 John Paul II, encyclical Centesimus annus (May 2, 1991)1 30: Origins 21 (May 16,
1991) 12-13; see also Leo XIII, encyclical Rerum novarum (May 15, 1891) 22, in The
Papal Encyclicals 1878-1903, ed. Claudia Carlen (Ann Arbor: Pierian Press, 1990)
246-247.
182 NCCB, "Economic Justice for All" 74, 420.
183 Ibid. 68,419.
184 In their 1986 pastoral letter on the U.S. economy, the U.S. bishops wrote: "Commu-
tative justice calls for fundamental fairness in all agreements and exchanges between in-
dividuals or private social groups." Ibid. See, e.g., Jon P. Gunnemann, "Capitalism and
Commutative Justice," Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics, ed. Alan B. Anderson et
al. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1985).
185 Distributive justice requires the Church, including its agencies and institutions, and
the faithful, to evaluate the allocation of income, wealth, and power in society, especially
relative to persons whose basic material needs remain unmet. NCCB, "Economic Justice
for All" 70, 419.
186 Social justice compels believers to recognize both their obligation to participate ac-
tively in the life of society and society's duty to enable them to do so. Scholars often refer
to social justice as contributive justice because the concept stresses the duty of everyone
who can do so to help create the goods, services, and spiritual values necessary for the
whole community's welfare. Ibid. 71. In their recent statement on taxation issues in
Catholic social thought, the Iowa bishops identified contributive justice as one of the two
basic moral principles, along with distributive justice, that should govern the tax system in
the State of Iowa. Contributive justice dictates that all citizens should pay taxes willingly
so that the government can provide for the common good. Iowa Catholic Bishops, "Taxa-
tion Issues in Catholic Social Thought," Origins 33 (December 4, 2003) 441,443.
187 NCCB, "Economic Justice for All" 70.
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reiterated the longstanding church teaching that the gospel requires us
"to come to the relief of the poor and to do so not merely out of [our] su-
perfluous goods."' 88 Later in that same document, the council called
upon the entire people of God, under the bishops' guidance and example,
to respond to this obligation "as was the ancient custom in the Church,
out of the substance of their goods and not only out of what is superflu-
ous." 189 In essence, social justice requires believers and the Church to act
for the common good. 190
In the Roman Catholic tradition, the collective wisdom of the Old and
New Testaments, papal encyclicals and universal Church documents,
and the teachings of the U.S.bishops on the economy challenge diocesan
bishops in this country, their advisors, and the faithful to reexamine ex-
isting practices regarding diocesan taxes and assessments under canon
law. All of these authorities stress distributive justice as well as the need
for the well-off to help support those less fortunate.
1 91
A. Scripture
Beginning in the Old Testament, the Bible consistently recognizes the
need for the faithful to tithe or to offer first fruits192 to express their
188 Gaudium et spes 69, in Sixteen Documents of Vatican II, 695; see also NCCB,
"Economic Justice for All" 68, 419.
189 Gaudium et spes 88.
190 NCCB, "Economic Justice for A 11" 71, 420; see also supra, note 186.
LUiC ula u, many tax policy debates certainly offers an explana-
tion, modem moral philosophers and religious ethicists somewhat surprisingly have not
given tax policy much attention. John Davis Feldmann, "Ethics and Taxes: An Ethical
Analysis of Anglo-American Tax Theory" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1986) 4-7
[on file with author]. Feldmann calls for ethicists again to focus on ethical considerations
in tax policy. Within the Roman Catholic tradition, the work of Charles E. Curran stands
as a notable exception. See, e.g., Charles E. Curran, "Just Taxation in the Roman Catholic
Tradition," Journal of Religious Ethics 13 (1985) 113; see also Feldmann, 22-32, who dis-
cusses other examples. In fact, a leading bibliography on Catholic thought lists only four
entries under the heading "Taxation." The Catholic University of America School of Law,
The Catholic Dimensions of Legal Study: The Catholic University Law School Annotated
Bibliography (2002, visited July 28, 2004) 113, available from http://www.law.cua.edu/
bibliography/catholic.pdf.
192 Although often mentioned in connection with tithes, first fruits convey the concepts
of priority in time and influence on the whole. By offering the first fruits to God in thanks-
giving, the contributor also sought to sanctify the entire harvest. See Kealy, Diocesan Fi-
nancial Support, 12-13. Some biblical references seem to equate the first fruits with
tithing. See, e.g., Dt. 12:6, 11, 17, 14:23. Unless otherwise indicated, all biblical refer-
ences rely upon the New American Bible. The New Testament epistles, however, general-
ly transform the term "first fruits" to refer to redemption rather than to financial support.
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adoration and thanks to God, to support the priests, to provide resources
to build and maintain places of worship, and to assist the poor and vul-
nerable. 193 Rather remarkably, the Old Testament describes three sepa-
rate tithes:194 the first for liturgical and priestly purposes, 195 the second
for social or convivial celebrations, 196 and the third--collected every
third year-at least in part to help support the poor.197 In addition, vari-
ous passages in the Old Testament direct farmers to leave part of the har-
vest behind for the poor, including widows, orphans, and aliens.1 98 Other
passages command sowers to let their land lie fallow every seventh year
so that the poor in the community can eat whatever grows that year.
199
In that context, the term applies first to Christ and then, by analogy, to the earliest converts,
to virgins, and to other believers, who sanctify humanity and assure redemption for those
believers who follow them. See Kealy, 22-23, who cites Col. 1:15 which describes Christ
as the "firstborn of all creation," 1 Cor. 15:20-23, Jas. 1:18, Rv. 14:4.
193 See, e.g., Gn. 14:20, where after Melchizedek, the king of Salem and a priest of God
Most High, brought out bread and wine and blessed Abram, the latter gave Melchizedek
one-tenth of his possessions; Gn. 28:22, when after Jacob dreamed at Bethel about a lad-
der to heaven, he responded to God's plan to give him and his descendants the land on
which he slept by vowing: "Of everything you give me, I will faithfully return a tenth part
to you;" Lv. 27:30, 32, requiring tithes from the grain of the field, the fruit from the tree,
and the herd and flock. See also Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 6-12.
194 See Th. 1:6-8; see generally Lee J. Seidler, "What Do Steve Forbes and Moses Have
in Common?," Tax Notes Today (October 28, 1996) 210-61, T 32. Seidler computes a
"heavenly approved flat tax rate totaling about 27 percent, not including two per capita or
per family taxes."
195 See, e.g., Nm. 18:21: "To the Levites, however, I hereby assign all tithes in Israel as
their heritage in recompense for the service they perform in the meeting tent;" Dt. 18:1-5,
assigning all sacrifices and first fruits given to God to the levitical priests; Th. 1:6-7, re-
ferring to "the first fruits of the field and the firstlings on the flock, together with a tenth of
my income and the first shearings of the sheep"). In turn, the Old Testament directed the
Levites to tithe. See, e.g., Nm. 18:26, referring to "a tithe of the tithes."
196 See, e.g., Dt. 14:22-26: after the Israelites gave a first tithe to the priests at the altar,
they either brought a second tithe on what remained to Jerusalem, where they partially
consumed the grain, wine, and oil in religious celebration or they sold the tithe and took
the money to Jerusalem, where they purchased oxen, sheep, wine, strong drink, or what-
ever else they desired and consumed it; Th. 1:7, describing a second tithe in money that
Tobit would take to Jerusalem each year, except for sabbatical years; Dt. 12:6, 11, 17, de-
scribing the need to take various offerings to Jerusalem and to rejoice in God's presence;
see also Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 9-10.
197 Dt. 14:28-29. This enabled the Levite priests, widows, orphans, and resident aliens
to eat.
198 Lv. 19:9-10, instructing harvesters not to reap to the edges of their fields and vine-
yard owners not to strip the vines bare or to gather the fallen grapes; see also Dt. 24:19-2 1,




Although references to tithes imply flat taxes, the Old Testament also
contains references to head taxes, 20 other regressive taxes, 20 1 and even
mentions a progressive system based upon ability to pay.202 As a result,
the Old Testament consistently expresses the need for the faithful not
only to support the community's liturgical efforts, but also to aid the less
fortunate.
20 3
The New Testament reaffirms and expands the Old Testament's teach-
ings about sacrificial offerings, especially the need to support the
poor.204 In Luke's gospel, John the Baptist challenged the crowds who
came to him for baptism to share their food and clothes with those in
need.20 5 During the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus taught the crowd that he
had come to fulfill the law and the prophets, not to abolish them.20 6 Jesus,
however, calls for "a new attitude of sacrificial discipleship" that sur-
passes any tithing formula. 20 7 The story of the widow's mite perhaps
highlights sacrificial giving at its best. After watching many rich people
200 See, e.g., Ex. 30:11-16, imposing a "half-shekel" offering on every individual at
least twenty years old as "forfeit money from the Israelites" for the service of the tent of
the meeting and specifically stating that "the rich need not give more, nor shall the poor
give less." Because such a "head tax" levies a fixed amount on each person, such taxes im-
pose a relatively greater burden on the poor. In that sense, commentators generally con-
sider head taxes as "regressive" because they take a greater percentage of income from the
poor than from the rich.
201 The temple fees in the story of Jesus's presentation in the temple, namely a pair of
turtledoves or two young pigeons, also illustrate a regressive tax under Old Testament law.
Lk. 2:22-24. Because Mary and Joseph were poor, Jewish law allowed them to offer two
birds rather than a sheep and either a pigeon or a turtledove. See Lv. 12:6-8.
202 See, e.g., Dt. 16:17: "Each of you with as much as he can give in proportion to the
blessings which the Lord, your God, has bestowed on you [shall appear before the Lord]."
203 See generally Susan Pace Hamill, "An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-
Christian Ethics," Alabama Law Review 54 (2002) 54-59.
204 NCCB, "Economic Justice for All" 16, 411; see also Hamill, "Argument for Tax
Reform," 61-63.
205 Lk. 3:11. In response to the crowds that asked what they should then do, Jesus
replied: "Whoever has two cloaks should share with the person who has none. And who-
ever has food should do likewise." Based upon such teachings, the Letter of James criti-
cized "you rich" for hoarding wealth. Jas. 5:1-6; see also Hamill, "Argument for Tax Re-
form," 64, n. 226. Hamill explains that these same individuals also failed to pay wages to
laborers.
206 Mt. 5:17. Jesus said: "Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the
prophets; I have come not to abolish but to fulfill." Luke's gospel reiterates this message:
"It is easier for heaven and earth to pass away than for the smallest part of a letter of the
law to become invalid." Lk. 16:17.
207 Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 16-17.
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put large sums into the temple treasury, while a widow deposited only
two small copper coins, Jesus remarked:
This poor widow put in more than all the other contributors to the
treasury. For they have all contributed from their surplus wealth,
but she, from her poverty, has contributed all she had, her whole
livelihood. °8
Jesus also called upon his followers to assist the vulnerable and taught
that sacrificial giving helps us identify with the poor.20 9 Jesus not only
reaffirmed the Old Testament's teachings about the poor and vulnerable,
but he amplified them by identifying the two greatest commandments as:
(1) "You shall love the Lord, your God, with all your heart, and with all
your soul, and with all your mind," and (2) "You shall love your neighbor
as yourself."2 10 Jesus also taught that our treatment of the needy will de-
termine whether we will enjoy eternal life or suffer eternal punishment. 211
The parable about the rich man and a poor man named Lazarus also warns
the rich that they must help the poor.212 In that parable, while being tor-
mented in Hades for his indifference to Lazarus, the rich man begs Abra-
ham to send Lazarus to warn the rich man's five brothers to repent. Abra-
ham replies: "If they will not listen to Moses and the prophets, neither will
they be persuaded if someone should rise from the dead,' 213 indicating
that the Mosaic law and the prophets provided ample guidance to the rich
man as to how he should have treated the poor during his life on earth.2 14
Similarly, Jesus placed very costly demands on the rich young man who
stated that he kept all the commandments, but wanted to know what he
must do to gain eternal life.2 15 Jesus responded: "If you wish to be perfect,
go, sell what you have and give to [the] poor, and you will have treasure in
heaven. Then come, follow me."
216
208 Mk. 12:41-44; see also Lk. 21:1-4 : "she from her poverty has offered her whole
livelihood."
209 See generally Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support, 16-17; Hamill, "Argument for
Tax Reform," 61-66.
210 Mt. 22:36-40; see also Mk. 12:28-31.
211 Mt. 25:31-46. In particular, when referring to those "on his right" who gave food to
the hungry, drink to the thirsty, welcome to strangers, clothing to the naked, care to the
sick or attention to those in prison and who will inherit the kingdom, Jesus states: "What-
ever you did for one of these least brothers of mine, you did for me." Mt. 25:40.
212 Lk. 16:19-31.
213 Lk. 16:31.
214 See Hamill, "Argument for Tax Reform," 62, n. 219.
215 Mt. 19:16-22; see also Lk. 18:18-25.
216 Mt. 19:21. The story ends with the young man departing in sadness because he had
many possessions. Mt. 19:22; see also Lk. 18:18-30 and Mk. 10:17-31, containing
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Jesus and his disciples practiced what he preached. John's gospel re-
ports that they kept a common purse out of which the group met their
own needs and gave amounts to the poor.
2 17
In the Acts of the Apostles, St. Luke describes the practices that the
early Christian community used to support the Church and the poor with-
in the community:
The community of believers was of one heart and mind, and no
one claimed that any possession was his own, but they had every-
thing in common.... There was no needy person among them,
for those who owned property or houses would sell them, bring
the proceeds of the sale, and put them at the feet of the apostles,
and they were distributed to each according to need.: i s
Accordingly, a community that follows Christ's teachings should not
guard its money and financial resources from the needs of the poor or an-
other community in the body of Christ. In his first letter to the Corinthi-
ans, St. Paul describes how one body of believers might assist another
group.219 At that time, the early Christians in Jerusalem faced significant
poverty, plus persecution from both the Romans and the Jews. Reiterat-
ing the directions St. Paul gave to the churches in Galatia,220 he also de-
scribes a discipline of giving to "the collection for the holy ones" 22 1 as
follows: "On the first day of the week each of you should set aside and
save whatever he can afford, so that collections will not be going on
when I come. And when I arrive, I shall send those whom you have
parallel passages. Similarly, Jesus warns the rich to avoid the temptation to put their focus
on and loyalty in earthly possessions rather than in God. Mt. 6:24: "No one can serve two
masters. He will either hate one and love the other, or be devoted to one and despise the
other. You cannot serve God and mammon." See also Lk. 16:13.
217 Jn. 12:6, 13:29.
218 Acts 4:32-37 (the last two verses describe how Barnabas sold a field that belonged
to him and laid the money at the apostles' feet). See also Acts 2:44-45: "All who believed
were together and had all things in common; they would sell their property and posses-
sions and divide them among all according to each one's need." In the first letter to the
Corinthians, St. Paul also expressly mentions that such collections should support the sa-
cred ministers. I Cor. 9:13-14: "The Lord ordered that those who preach the gospel
should live by the gospel;" see also 1 Tm. 5:17-18, suggesting double compensation for
those elders, especially those who preach and teach.
219 1 Cor. 16:1-4.
220 See Gal. 2:9-10, describing how James, Cephas, and John-the acknowledged
leaders of the Church in Jerusalem-asked only that Paul and Barnabas "remember the
poor" in their ministry to the Gentiles.
221 1 Cor. 16:1.
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approved with letters of recommendation to take your gracious gift to
Jerusalem."222 In his second letter to the Corinthians, Paul also urges the
faithful to follow the example of the churches of Macedonia, 223 who vol-
untarily gave "according to their means, [and] beyond their means, spon-
taneously, and begged us insistently for the favor of taking part in the ser-
vice to the holy ones."224 The earliest Christian communities showed
great concern for their sister churches and took up collections for believ-
ers in need living in other communities.
225
B. Papal and Other Universal Church Documents
Based upon these Scripture passages, especially those from the New
Testament, Catholic social teaching has long recognized an obligation to
support the Church and its efforts to assist the dependent and less fortu-
nate. In the late nineteenth century, Rerum novarum marked the Church's
first comprehensive effort to recognize social justice as an integral part of
its mission in the modem world. When questions arise about protecting
the rights of individuals, this encyclical concluded that the poor and the
helpless merit special consideration. Accordingly, this teaching first ad-
umbrated the so-called "preferential option for the poor."226 While only
briefly referring to public taxes, Pope Leo XIII observed that a political
state prospers and thrives through, among other things, "the moderat[e]
and fair imposing of public taxes." 227 When discussing the fundamental
right to possess private property, the encyclical also cautioned against
222 1 Cor. 16:2-3; see also 2 Cor. 8:9, 12-15: "For you know the gracious act of our
Lord Jesus Christ, that for your sake he became poor although he was rich, so that by his
poverty you might become rich.... As a matter of equality your surplus at the present time
should supply their needs, so that their surplus may also supply your needs, so that there
may be equality;" Gal. 2:10, sharing the instruction to "be mindful of the poor."
223 2 Cor. 8:1-14.
224 2 Cor. 8:3-4; see also Rom. 15:26-27; Heb. 13:16.
225 Acts 11:27-30; Rom. 15:26-27; see also Kealy, Diocesan Financial Support,
24-25.
226 Rerum novarum 37: "Still, when there is question of defending the rights of indi-
viduals, the poor and badly off have a claim to especial consideration." In Sollicitudo rei
socialis, Pope John Paul II specifically refers to "the option or love of preference for the
poor," which he describes as "a special form of primacy in the exercise of Christian char-
ity, to which the whole tradition of the Church bears witness." John Paul II, encyclical Sol-
licitudo rei socialis (December 30, 1987) 142: Origins 17 (March 3, 1988) 656. He does
not use the phrase "the so-called 'preferential option for the poor"' in an encyclical until
1991. Centesimus annus 11. See generally Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching
1891-Present: A Historical, Theological, and Ethical Analysis (Washington: Georgetown
University Press, 2002) 183.
227 Rerum novarum 32.
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"excessive taxation" and the dangers that can arise if the state "deprive[s]
the private owner of more than is fair."
228
More recently in 1961 in Mater et magistra, Pope John XXIII wrote
that "in a system of taxation based on justice and equity it is fundamen-
tal that the burdens be proportioned to the capacity of the people con-
tributing. '229 Although that specific statement addressed economic poli-
cies needed to maintain an appropriate balance between agriculture and
industry in the modem economy, the encyclical also observed that the
Church "relies not merely upon her teaching to hold aloft the torch of
charity, but also upon her own widespread example." 230 Accordingly, the
principles underlying that encyclical regarding taxation apply equally to
the Church's internal affairs. In Justice in the World, the World Synod of
Catholic Bishops articulated the challenge: "While the Church is bound
to give witness to justice, she recognizes that anyone who ventures to
speak to people about justice must first be just in their eyes. Hence, we
must undertake an examination of the modes of acting.., found within
the Church herself."231
These texts from Vatican II and implementing provisions in canon law
recognize the Church's obligation to support the poor throughout the
world, whether inside the diocese or elsewhere. 232 Not surprisingly, Pope
John Paul II has recognized social justice as an integral part of the
Church's mission in the modem world. In Centesimus annus, he de-
scribes the duty of charity as "the duty to give from one's 'abundance'
and sometimes even out of one's needs in order to provide what is essen-
tial for the life of a poor person."233 As noted earlier, he used the phrase
"the so-called 'preferential option for the poor"' for the first time in a
papal encyclical.234
C. Teachings of the Bishops in the United States
In their 1986 pastoral letter on the U.S. economy, the U.S. bishops de-
scribed the Church as "a visible social institution functioning in this
228 Ibid. $ 47.
229 Mater et magistra 132.
230 Ibid. 6.
231 World Synod of Catholic Bishops, Justice in the World (December 31, 1971) 40,
available from http://www.osjspm.org/cst/jw.htm; see also NCCB, "Economic Justice for
All" 68, 419.
232 See supra, notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
233 Centesimus annus 36.
234 See supra, note 226.
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world. 235 In that same document, when discussing the Church as an eco-
nomic actor, the bishops stressed their belief and teaching that "all the
moral principles that govern the just operation of any economic endeav-
or apply to the [C]hurch and its agencies and institutions" and articulat-
ed the need for the Church to model "exemplary" behavior.
236
Earlier in this letter, the bishops referred to "a system of taxation based
on assessment according to ability to pay" as a "prime necessity for the
fulfillment of [the social obligations to meet the converging demands of
the three forms of basic justice-commutative justice, distributive jus-
tice, and social justice]."237 The pastoral letter also explicitly recognized
that tax policies create incentives that influence behavior and can en-
courage businesses and individuals to act responsibly and to seek the
common good.238 As an implicit corollary, tax policies can also produce
dysfunctional behaviors or negative outcomes.
As an overall framework to fight poverty in the United States, the bish-
ops' letter proposed seven elements necessary for an effective national
strategy. 9 One element calls upon the United States to use three princi-
ples to evaluate the public tax system in this country and its effect on the
poor.240 First, the tax system should raise adequate revenues to pay for
society's needs, especially our obligation to meet the poor's basic needs.
Second, it should use a progressive structure so that those taxpayers en-
joying relatively greater financial resources pay a higher tax rate. The
bishops explicitly commented that such a structure would reduce the "se-
vere inequalities of income and wealth" in the United States. 24 1 Third,
the system should not require families below the official poverty line to
pay income taxes. 242 Such an exemption illustrates a "preferential option
235 NCCB, "Economic Justice for All" 339, 445.
236 Ibid. 347, 446.
237 Ibid. 76, 73, 68,419, 420.
238 Ibid. 117, 118,424.
239 Ibid. 9 195-214,431-432.
240 Ibid. [202, 431.
241 Ibid. Earlier, the pastoral letter observed that "Catholic social teaching does not
maintain that a fiat, arithmetical equality of income and wealth is a demand of justice, but
it does challenge economic arrangements that leave large numbers of people impover-
ished." Ibid. 74, 420; see also Iowa Catholic Bishops, "Taxation Issues in Catholic So-
cial Thought," 443, suggesting that state spending in Iowa should first ensure the poor and
vulnerable's basic needs before undertaking other appropriations and expressing a prefer-
ence for a more progressive form of taxation under Catholic social teaching.
242 NCCB, "Economic Justice for All" 202, 431. By definition, those families already
lack sufficient resources to purchase life's basic necessities, and the tax system should not
force them also to pay income taxes. In a footnote, the U.S. bishops praised the then-recent
THE JURIST
for the poor."243 In addition, the bishops recognized the need both to raise
adequate revenues and to allocate equitably the burdens arising from the
tax.
244
Subsequently, on the tenth anniversary of the bishops' letter, the bish-
ops sought "to encourage lively dialogue and principled action on a wide
variety of issues and concerns, including... [h]ow can the church prac-
tice in its own life and institutions what it preaches to others about eco-
nomic justice ... ."245
V Conclusion and Recommendations
Using the bishops' teachings about national tax policy as a general
guide, 246 any diocesan taxes and assessments under canon law should:
(1) raise adequate revenues to fund the diocese's needs, including the
obligation to assist the poor in the diocese, poorer parishes in the diocese,
and other dioceses and to support the Apostolic See; (2) use progressive
rates so that those parishes and other taxable entities enjoying relatively
greater financial resources pay a higher tax rate; (3) exempt poorer
parishes from the tax (or at least subject them to lower tax rates than
Tax Reform Act of 1986 for removing virtually all families below the official poverty line
from the federal income tax rolls. Ibid. T 202, 451, n. 60.
243 Ibid. IT 16, 85-91, 202, 411, 421-422,451, n. 60. The bishops' letter actually used
the term "fundamental 'option for the poor."'
244 Bishops can use two traditional tax policy tools-vertical equity and horizontal eq-
uity-to determine whether a tax equitably allocates the burdens. Vertical equity, which
focuses on a taxpayer's ability to pay the tax, attempts to apportion the tax burden fairly
among taxpayers in different economic positions in terms of income and wealth. By com-
parison, horizontal equity recognizes that taxpayers in similar circumstances should bear
a similar tax burden. Hamill, "Argument for Tax Reform," 7.
245 NCCB, "Decade After 'Economic Justice for All,"' 392.
246 Because the universal Church has directed its social teaching about tax policy pri-
marily to taxation by secular and often democratic nation states, canon law need not nec-
essarily employ the same systems of taxation to accomplish the goals of "justice and eq-
uity" within the Church. See supra, note 229 and accompanying text. Viewing a parish as
a stable community within the diocese, see supra, note 31 and accompanying text, for ex-
ample, challenges some of the parallels between the civil tax system and diocesan tax sys-
tems. Although no "poverty line" exists for parishes, a parish nevertheless needs adequate
financial resources on a longer-term basis to survive as a stable community. Stable parish-
es simply cannot endure persistent deficits without facing fundamental change, such as
closure or consolidation. As a unit of a broader diocese, bankruptcy does not offer poten-
tial relief to a particular parish. At the same time, shared faith values, perhaps including
different assumptions about human behavior and appropriate administrative responses,
might suggest alternative approaches within the diocesan setting. This article, however,
does not attempt to develop or evaluate such possibilities.
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richer parishes); (4) influence desirable behavior; and (5) seek to ease ad-
ministrative burdens and operate as efficiently as reasonably possible.
In particular, this article has attempted to demonstrate that the sources
urging the bishops in the United States to use progressive rates whenev-
er they impose taxes under canon 1263247 include Scripture, Catholic so-
cial teaching, and the general policies supporting progressive taxes.248 In
essence, progressive tax rates comport more closely with the messages
247 Assuming that diocesan revenues remain the same in any conversion to a system
that uses progressive tax rates, the diocesan bishop must not cut diocesan support to poor-
er parishes and the needy. If the bishop reduces such expenditures or support, the net re-
sult may actually create a more regressive system than existed previously. See supra, note
156.
248 Very simply, proponents of progressive taxes generally point to their redistributive
effects, which leave after-tax incomes more nearly equal than before-tax incomes; the de-
clining marginal utility of money, which posits that the first dollars of income typically
purchase necessities while, at least in the case of high-income persons, the last dollars of
income buy luxuries, which the high-income taxpayers could forego without much pain;
and the notion that ability to pay should influence tax liability. In response, critics com-
plain that the higher marginal tax rates present in progressive taxes discourage work effort,
promote misallocation of capital, and increase tax-sheltering or tax evasion. See general-
ly Gunn and Ward, Federal Income Taxation, 10-13.
In 1952, two law professors at the University of Chicago Law School started the
modem public policy debate about the wisdom of progressive taxes. Blum and Kalven,
"Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation;" see also Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
After their article, numerous books and literally hundreds of articles have addressed the
"flat" versus "progressive" issue from a public policy standpoint, including several arti-
cles that specifically address philosophical, ethical, or moral dimensions in the debate.
See, e.g., Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax, 2d ed. (Stanford: Hoover In-
stitution Press, 1995), proposing a uniform nineteen percent tax rate, after authorizing a
family of four to deduct the first $25,500 from income as a "personal allowance;" Charles
0. Galvin and Boris I. Bittker, The Income Tax: How Progressive Should It Be? (Wash-
ington: American Enterprise Institute, 1969), presenting a "rational debate" in which
Dean Galvin proposes a comprehensive tax base and a flat tax rate while Professor Bittker
argues in support of progressive taxation; Bankman and Griffith, "Social Welfare," criti-
cizing traditional legal analysis for not using a theory of distributive justice-albeit not re-
ferring to Catholic social teaching-to evaluate progressive taxation, or any other rate
structures, and using modem political theory and economics to reach the conclusion that
a combination of cash payments and constant, or even declining, marginal rates offers the
best way to implement an optimal progressive tax; Byrne, "Progressive Taxation Revisit-
ed," 771-786, describing three philosophical approaches to the issues of fairness that give
progressive taxation its instinctive appeal; Kornhauser, "Rhetoric," 518-523, concluding
that both a feminist view of humanity and neoconservative philosophy support progres-
sive taxation; Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and Alice G. Abreu, "Winner-Take-All Markets:
Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation," Florida Tax Review 4 (1998) 65-71, discussing
the equities of progressive taxation.
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that the gospel, the universal Church, and the bishops themselves convey.
Although flat taxes enjoy biblical roots, even the Old Testament contains
references to taxes based on the ability to pay.249 While flat tax rates offer
simplicity250 and existing diocesan programs to support "parishes in
need" may redistribute parish resources as much as a progressive tax sys-
tem would, diocesan bishops can rather easily adopt progressive rates
with little, if any, loss in overall revenue to the diocese.251 Even if a
249 See supra, note 202 and accompanying text.
250 Given the skeletal administrative staff in many dioceses and parishes, a flat tax
based only on easily enumerated revenues, particularly when the bishop uses "parish in
need" programs and other mechanisms in an effort to accomplish both intra- and inter-
diocesan economic justice, offers considerable appeal. For example, in some circum-
stances a simple flat tax on parishes, say five percent of offertory collections, might pro-
vide a more equitable and just system than a more complex progressive tax system that
yields the same dollars. Tax systems that combine simplicity and low tax rates ease ad-
ministrative burdens on both the collector and the payors and reduce incentives to manip-
ulate or defraud the system. As a practical matter, dioceses generally must rely on cooper-
ation and self-policing to obtain compliance and may find it difficult to hold parishes that
cheat on their taxes accountable. Moreover, in a flat tax system, all parishes can feel they
are being treated equally, and no one can question why various tax brackets were set at the
applicable amounts. We should recognize, however, that by prohibiting per capita taxes,
canon law has rejected-at least implicitly-simplicity as the paramount objective. See
supra, note 81 and accompanying text.
Alternatively, the concept of prominence-the tendency of individuals seeking to
solve a problem in concert with others to settle on the most prominent, or conspicuous, so-
lution-may explain the predominate use of flat diocesan taxes and assessments in the
United States. Faced with the need to select a tax structure, a bishop and his advisors might
recommend a flat rate tax system simply because no other rate structure comes immedi-
ately to mind. Cf. Bankman and Griffith, "Social Welfare," 1914, discussing the federal in-
come tax.
251 For example, assume that a particular diocese includes only the following five
parishes with the listed characteristics:
Name of parish Assessable income Number of families
All Saints $80,000 500
Blessed Sacrament 100,000 300
Christ the King 600,000 1,200
Divine Word 900,000 1,000
Eternal Light 1.500.000 2.500
Totals $3180000 5500
Further assume that the diocese imposes a flat ten percent tax on assessable income. As a
result, the diocesan tax raises $318,000 to support diocesan needs as follows:
Name of parish Flat tax Computations
All Saints $8,000 $80,000 x. 10
Blessed Sacrament 10,000 $100,000 x. 10
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diocese has adopted a "parish in need" program to assist poorer parishes,
appearances of progressivity remain critical. Catholic social teaching
provokes the bishops and the faithful in the United States to work to-
wards diocesan tax practices that both in fact and in appearance advance
distributive justice by either exempting poorer parishes from diocesan
taxes or assessments, 252 or subjecting those parishes to lower tax rates
Christ the King 60,000 $600,000 x. 10
Divine Word 90,000 $900,000 x. 10
Eternal Light 15000 $1,500,000 x. 10
Total $3 18.000
Imagine that the bishop decides to propose a new system that allows a $200 per family ex-
clusion and the following simple, but incremental, progressive rate structure:
Assessable Income Minus Exclusion
Between Zero and $300,000
Over $300,000
Applicable Tax
10% of the amount
$30,000, plus 20% of the amount
over $300,000







Pro gressive tax Computations
$-0- $80,000 - (500 families x $200 per
family, or $100,000 ) = $0 taxable
income, which means no tax.
4,000 $100,000 - (300 families x $200 per
family, or $60,000) = $40,000 taxable
income, taxed at ten percent.
42,000 $600,000 - (1,200 families x $200 per
family, or $240,000) = $360,000
taxable income. The tax equals
$30,000 + (.20 x $60,000).
110,000 $900,000 - (1,000 families x $200 per
family, or $200,000) = $700,000 tax
able income. The tax equals $30,000
+ (.20 x $400,000).
170,000 $1,500,000 - (2,500 families x $200
per family, or $500,000) = $1,000,000
taxable income. The tax equals
$30,000 + (.20 x $700,000).
Total $326.000
Under the proposed tax structure, three parishes, namely All Saints, Blessed Sacrament,
and Christ the King, would see their diocesan tax bills drop. The diocesan assessments at
Divine Word and Eternal Light, however, would increase by $20,000 at each parish, which
translates to $20 and $8 per family, respectively, at those parishes.
252 To symbolize participation in the diocese and the broader Church, the bishop might
ask those parishes that do not share their "treasure" with the diocese to contribute their
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than more affluent parishes. To facilitate this process, the USCCB should
consider undertaking a project that would draft one or more "model"
progressive diocesan tax systems for diocesan bishops to bring back to
their dioceses for consultation and possible implementation. 53 Although
beyond the scope of this article, such reforms in diocesan tax policies
would also enable the bishops in the United States to speak more authen-
tically on federal and state income tax issues, and especially to oppose
the periodically recurring efforts to move to a flat federal income tax.
2 54
"time and talent" to the diocese in some way. For example, those parishes might sponsor
ceremonies to pray for diocesan and universal Church goals; allow the diocese to use their
facilities on a rent-free basis; help to plan, organize, or lead special liturgies for the dio-
cese; designate representatives for diocesan committees and boards; or offer some other
sign of sacrifice in support of diocesan activities. Similar to the now-repealed cathe-
draticum in the 1917 code, such acts indicate subjection to the bishop's authority and also
convey communion with the diocese as part of the universal Church. See supra, notes
78-80 and accompanying text.
253 The nation's largest archdioceses almost certainly enjoy the resources and expertise
necessary to develop and implement diocesan taxes that use progressive tax rates. Given
their size, administrative complexity, and social and economic diversity, those dioceses
also most closely resemble the nation states directly addressed in the Church's social
teachings. See supra, note 246. Although more pressing priorities and enforcement con-
cerns might alter the environment in important ways, the discussions of tax policy on the
national level most closely translate to those archdioceses.
Smaller and less wealthy dioceses may lack either the resources or the expertise
necessary to study this issue on their own. At the same time, solutions in the largest, urban
archdioceses do not always work well in smaller or rural dioceses. In addition, needless
costs arise when every diocese considers a common problem individually. As a result, the
USCCB should consider undertaking a project that would draft one or more "model" sys-
tems of progressive diocesan tax systems for less wealthy dioceses. Keeping the "prefer-
ential option for the poor" in mind, any such project should initially consider both the
needs and the environment in the poorest dioceses in this country. Similarly, that same
teaching requires that any model give special consideration to the needs of the poorest
parishes in the diocese.
254 Efforts to enact a "flat" federal income tax did not end with Steve Forbes's unsuc-
cessful bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1996. Legislation to amend the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, to impose flat taxes on individuals and busi-
nesses has again already been introduced in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate during the 108th Congress, which began in January 2003. See, e.g., House, Free-
dom Flat Tax Bill, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, H.R. 1783. Retired House Majority
Leader Richard K. Armey, a leading advocate for a flat tax system, predicts that a "second
term, popular President in the White House and a comfortable majority in Congress come
2004 - both of which are committed to tax reform [- could present] a once in a lifetime
chance to make real change... " Dick Armey, "This Tax Day, Go Flat," Tax Notes Today
(April 14, 2003) 72-27, T 20; see also Patti Mohr, "Tax Reform Movement in the Works,
Armey Says," Tax Notes Today (June 9, 2003) 111-4. More recently, House Majority
Leader Tom DeLay predicted that a Republican victory in the 2004 elections would allow
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Those dioceses that already use progressive tax rates for their diocesan
taxes and assessments should eliminate any non-incremental tax brackets
and bubbles.255 Any diocese already using or adopting progressive rates
should remember that when very little spread exists between the lowest
and highest tax rates, the system essentially becomes a "flat" tax.256
a complete tax overhaul, including the elimination of the IRS in favor of a national sales
tax. Alternatively, he mentioned a flat income tax. Dustin Stamper & Heidi Glenn,
"DeLay: GOP Election Victories Would Bring Major Tax Reform," Tax Notes Today
(March 24, 2004) 78-5. Although other Republican lawmakers have expressed skepticism
about either prospect, ibid., the House Republican Policy Committee has announced plans
for a long-term agenda on fundamental tax reform. Dustin Stamper, "House GOP Policy
Committee Embraces DeLay's Call for Major Tax Reform," Tax Notes Today (March 25,
2004) 59-3. National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson recently predicted that the widening
reach of the alternative minimum tax will lead to major tax reform within the next decade
and further speculated that either a flat tax or a consumption tax could replace the current
income tax. Allen Kenney, "AMT to Bring Big Changes, Olson Tells Low-Income Advo-
cates," Tax Notes Today (June 23, 2004) 122-2. Although quite distant from the federal in-
come tax, L. Paul Bremer III, then the U.S. administrator of the Coalition Provisional Au-
thority in Iraq, recently signed an order establishing a flat fifteen percent tax on Iraqi
individual and corporate income, effective January 1, 2004. See Jonathan Rickman, "Iraq
to Establish 15 Percent Flat Tax in 2004," Tax Notes Today (November 4, 2003)
215-9.
Although the federal income tax on individuals remains the largest and most pro-
gressive tax in the United States, the past twenty-five years have witnessed a sharp decline
in the highest rate from seventy percent as recently as 1981 to the current thirty-five per-
cent. For a short article arguing that the current trend in federal tax policy towards elimi-
nating progressiveness conflicts with Catholic social thought, see Christopher R. Cocoz-
za, "Paying the Piper," America (March 29, 2004) 7-9.
In addition, the bishops may want to address the trend that has increasingly favored
investment income over wage income as witnessed most recently by the 2003 reduction in
the maximum statutory tax rate on qualified dividends and net capital gains to fifteen per-
cent, a rate which falls well below the statutory maximum thirty-five percent on wages and
other earned income. Furthering this discrimination, Social Security and Medicare taxes
do not apply to investment income. See Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy, "Feder-
al Taxation of Earnings versus Investment Income in 2004," Tax Notes Today (May 8,
2004) 91-26.
On the state level, both the Iowa Catholic Conference and the Oregon Catholic Con-
ference have recently issued statements regarding taxation policies in their states. Iowa
Catholic Bishops, "Taxation Issues in Catholic Social Thought," 441, 443.
255 See supra, note 141 and accompanying text.
256 Cf. Hamill, "Argument for Tax Reform," 16, n. 35, discussing Alabama's income
tax structure. For example, assume a diocesan tax system that uses the following progres-
sive, and incremental, rates:
Assessable Income Applicable Rate
Between Zero and $10,000 4% of the amount
Between $10,000 and $20,000 $400, plus 8% of the amount over $10,000
Over $20,000 $1,200, plus 10% of the amount over $20,000
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For any diocesan bishop who feels compelled to use flat rates, simple
alternative reforms, such as creating or increasing a standard deduction
or exemption, could remove poorer parishes from the diocesan tax rolls
and improve the diocesan tax's progressivity by reducing effective tax
rates on low- and moderate-income parishes. 257 The use of a standard de-
duction or exemption essentially creates an extra tax bracket at the bot-
tom of the income scale with a zero tax rate. 5 8 In addition, allowing a
parish to subtract a deduction or exemption amount259 for each registered
parishioner or family would address concerns that a progressive tax
would more heavily tax larger parishes.
260
If they have not already done so recently, the diocesan bishops in the
United States should reexamine their diocesan tax and assessment prac-
tices in light of the 1983 code and change any nonconforming practices
where necessary or appropriate. Some dioceses may not have undertak-
en such a reexamination since Pope John Paul II promulgated the new
code in 1983. Even though it repealed the cathedraticum,26 1 at least
twenty percent of the eighty-five dioceses in the NDLS survey refer to
diocesan taxes or assessments under the 1983 code as a "cathe-
draticum."262 While simply adopting the old term to refer to the current
Although such a structure appears progressive, if all the parishes in the diocese report as-
sessable income over $20,000, the rate structure would essentially operate as a flat tax in
the sense that the diocese would impose a ten percent tax on every additional dollar of as-
sessable income in the diocese.
257 See supra, note 88, discussing degressive taxes; see also Hall & Rabushka, The Flat
Tax, 31, observing that a progressive tax system does not require different marginal rates;
cf. Hamill, "Argument for Tax Reform," 12, n. 20, discussing benefits of larger exemptions
to low-income taxpayers.
258 Cf. Hamill, "Argument for Tax Reform," 12, n. 19, noting that the federal personal
exemption removes low-income individuals from the income tax rolls.
259 Under canon law, a bishop can authorize such a deduction or exemption from oth-
erwise reportable income in the calculation of assessable income. See supra, notes 73-77
and accompanying text.
260 To illustrate this potential criticism, imagine two parishes, the first containing twice
as many parishioners as the second. Suppose everyone in both parishes has indistinguish-
able characteristics, such as the same income and financial resources and an identical
propensity to contribute to their parish. If the diocese imposes a progressive tax on these
parishes, the larger parish will pay more than twice the tax that the smaller one pays, just
because the first parish contains more parishioners. If we make the larger parish slightly
poorer on the average than the smaller one, the situation becomes even worse: the system
taxes poorer people more heavily than richer ones. Although the larger parish may enjoy
some economies of scale, a deduction or exemption that in some way increases with the
size of the parish would address such concerns.
261 See supra, note 20.
262 See supra, note 147 and accompanying text.
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taxes and assessments does not come close to presenting the biggest
problem in the modem Church, the nationwide use of another term
would minimize potential confusion.
With regard to other substantive issues, recall that canon 1263 requires
diocesan taxes and assessments to qualify as "proportionate to income."
As a result, canon 1263 does not authorize per capita taxes, or assess-
ments that levy a fixed amount on each person or taxpayer subject to the
exaction. That language similarly disqualifies any system that deter-
mines the diocesan tax or assessment, whether in whole or in part, on the
number of parishioners, families, envelope holders, contributing parish-
ioners or families, or students in the diocesan schools.
2 6 3
Because canon 1263 does not specify how the diocesan bishop must de-
termine "incomes," the dioceses enjoy considerable discretion in that re-
gard. All bishops and their advisors, however, should keep in mind that
taxation systems often shape behavior. As a result, the definition and de-
termination of assessable income can encourage the parishes in a diocese
to engage in desired activities or to fund certain programs. Any exclusions
or deductions from income should accurately measure a parish's ability to
pay. Wealth and accumulated assets affect ability to pay, so bishops and
their advisors should consider provisions requiring parishes to add certain
deposits or investments to otherwise reportable income in computing the
amount of assessable income. 264 At the same time, dioceses should ar-
guably avoid credits, caps, and tax rates that vary depending upon factors
other than income, because such provisions arguably violate the directive
in canon law that the bishop must determine the tax based on "income."
Although a well-known dictum from a landmark decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States says that "the power to tax involves
the power to destroy, 265 diocesan taxes and assessments allow a parish
to help the diocese and the universal Church to build the kingdom of God
here on earth. The closing sentence of the bishops' letter reads: "Love
implies concern for all-especially the poor-and a continued search for
those social and economic structures that permit everyone to share in a
community that is part of a redeemed creation."266 Using progressive
rates to impose diocesan taxes would better enable the U.S. bishops to
practice what the gospel, the universal Church, and they themselves
263 See supra, note 81 and accompanying text.
264 See supra, note 77 and accompanying text.
265 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
266 NCCB, "Economic Justice for All" 1 365,448.
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teach and potentially further the Church's efforts to build God's earthly
kingdom throughout the world.
APPENDIX
NDLS Survey Methodology and Observations
To gather information about current diocesan taxing practices in the
United States for this project, Research Librarian Patti J. Ogden used
diocesan web sites, short e-mail requests for information, and several
telephone conversations in an effort to collect data from 176 of the 195
dioceses then in the United States.' At least eleven dioceses post infor-
mation about their diocesan taxes and assessments on their web sites.
2
Using links from a page on the USCCB's web site, Ogden sent e-mail
messages containing a short survey 3 to specific addressees at 144 of the
1 When the survey began, the USCCB listed 195 dioceses on its web site at
<http://www.usccb.org/dioceses.htm>, visited April 9, 2003. Subsequently, the Eparchy
of St. Peter the Apostle of San Diego for Chaldeans was added to the list. United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S. Catholic Dioceses by State, at http://www
.usccb.org/dioceses.htm, visited July 28, 2004. The NDLS survey made no attempt to
gather information from that eparchy or the following nineteen dioceses that ministered to
the spiritual needs of various ethnic groups, the military, or the faithful in the Virgin Is-
lands: Apostolic Exarchate of Armenian Catholics, Byzantine Catholic Eparchy of Passa-
ic of the Ruthenians, Byzantine Eparchy of Parma, Byzantine Eparchy of Van Nuys for the
Ruthenians, Eparchy of Our Lady of Lebanon of Los Angeles for Maronites, Eparchy of
St. Thomas the Apostle, Eparchy of St. Thomas of Chicago of the Syro-Malabar, Lithuan-
ian Catholics outside Lithuania, Military Services, Newton (Greek-Melkite), Our Lady of
Deliverance of Newark of the Syrians, Philadelphia for Ukrainians, Pittsburgh (Byzantine
Rite), Romanian Eparchy of St. George in Canton, St. Maron of Brooklyn for the Ma-
ronites, St. Nicholas in Chicago for Ukrainians, St. Thomas VI, Ukrainian Catholic Dio-
cese of St. Josaphat in Parma, and Ukrainian Catholic Diocese of Stamford.
2 The web sites of the following dioceses, arranged in alphabetical order according to
their listing on the USCCB web site, discussed their assessments: Austin, Evansville,
Gallup, Joliet, Orange, Peoria, Tucson, Venice, Wheeling-Charleston, Worcester, and
Youngstown. Those dioceses are to be commended for making information about their
diocesan assessments readily accessible.
3 A representative e-mail request for information read as follows:
I am research librarian working for a tax professor here at Notre Dame Law
School. Prof. Barrett is writing an article about the canon law aspects of dioce-
san taxation, and as part of his research he is seeking information about how
diocesan taxation is implemented in the various dioceses of the United States.
Assuming most dioceses use a flat tax (all parishes subject to the same percent-
age), what is the range of assessment rates? For those that do utilize a progres-
sive tax, what kind of tier structure is used?
I realize that some dioceses do not consider this information to be public, while
others actually make it readily available. Not knowing the practice of your
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remaining 165 dioceses.4 She received responses from seventy-seven
dioceses, or almost 53.5 percent of the dioceses contacted.5 Five dioce-
ses responded to inquiries, but chose not to provide information about
their diocesan taxes.6 As a result, the efforts to collect information gath-
ered data about the actual practices in eighty-five dioceses in the United
States.
Although twelve dioceses or their representatives explicitly stated that
their bishops do not impose a diocesan tax, 7 the information obtained
from at least two dioceses indicates that an annual appeal in the diocese
set a mandatory goal or target for each parish in the diocese.8 Two other
responses mention assessments for either a priests' retirement program,
schools in the diocese, or the diocesan newspaper.9 One other diocese an-
ticipates a diocesan tax in an upcoming fiscal year.10 Accepting the re-
sponses from those twelve dioceses as nevertheless accurate leaves a
sample of seventy-three dioceses that view themselves as imposing
diocesan taxes or assessments.
diocese, I can only beg your indulgence at our impertinence in even posing the
question. If you can provide us with the data on your diocese, we would be grate-





Notre Dame Law School
The actual requests varied slightly from diocese to diocese depending on whether we al-
ready knew something about their policy or rate from the web or could tell the addressee
how many dioceses had already responded to our requests for information.
4 I made telephone calls to the Archdioceses of Chicago and New York. For various
reasons, including the lack of a web link, a web site under construction, or the inability to
direct an electronic request to a specific person, the survey did not request information
from the following nineteen dioceses: Amarillo, Arlington, Atlanta, Boston, Duluth, El
Paso, Honolulu, Jackson, Knoxville, Lincoln, Little Rock, Manchester, Nashville, Nor-
wich, Oklahoma City, Santa Rosa, Tulsa, Wichita, and Yakima.
5 In addition, three other dioceses that provide information about their diocesan as-
sessments on the web sites responded to requests for clarification or additional informa-
tion. NDLS Survey Response Nos. 12, 54, and 76.
6 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 79, 87-90.
7 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 1, 3, 4, 11, 22, 28, 34, 37, 54, 62, 65, and 86.
8 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 22 and 37.
9 NDLS Survey Response Nos. 1 and 86.
10 NDLS Survey Response No. 3.
